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INTRODUCTION
H azardous waste liability is among the most rigorously regulated
and litigated environmental issues. In the wake of major envi-
ronmental disasters of the past two decades, regulation of hazardous
substances has expanded markedly.' Federal regulation now pro-
foundly impacts the management of solid and hazardous wastes,2 the
management of toxic substances,3 the disposal of waste products,' and
the cleanup of hazardous waste sites.' Many states have promulgated
their own regulations, some of which have surpassed the strictures of
federal law.' Fines imposed under natural resource damage assess-
*J.D. Candidate, 1995, Fordham University.
1. For an exhaustive review of the progress of the environmental movement in-
cluding a roster of infamous environmental disasters, see Barry Commoner, A Re-
porter at Large: The Environment, NEW YORKER, June 15, 1987, at 46. See also
Richard L. Stroup, Hazardous Waste Policy: A Property Rights Perspective, 20 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 868 (Sept. 22, 1989).
2. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6986 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). For a synopsis of RCRA regulations, see
Michael A. Brown & Wm. Roger Truitt, EPA Development of New RCRA Regula-
tions, Guidance Brings Understanding of Far-Reaching Effects of 19&4 Amendments,
16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1154 (Nov. 1, 1985).
3. Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
4. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), as amended by
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9621 note-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6986,(1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
5. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
6. Federal regulations provide a minimum regulatory floor below which state en-
vironmental laws cannot fall. Old Bridge Chems. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Pro-
tection, 965 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 602 (1992). -States are
permitted to create laws that raise the federal minimum standards. Id. at 1296 ("[A]
state is not precluded from adopting more stringent requirements than those imposed
by EPA regulations.").
California and New Jersey lead the nation in environmental regulations. Califor-
nia's clean air regulations are the most comprehensive in the nation, and include the
"California List," a roster of hazardous wastes that distinguishes between "hazardous
wastes," "extremely hazardous wastes," and "restricted hazardous wastes." CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25117, 25115, 25122.7 (Deering 1995). See Air Re-
sources Board Votes to Tighten Emissions, Durability Standards for Autos, 20 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 450 (June 16, 1989).
New Jersey's 1977 spill fund for the cleanup of hazardous waste sites, the first in the
nation, was the model for the federal Superfund. Gordon Bishop, Jersey Blazing a
Trail in Toxic Chemical Research, SUNDAY STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Dec. 1,
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ment ("NRDA") regulations7 upon parties' whose illegal activities
have damaged the natural environment often exceed even the high
remediation costs found under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA" or
"Superfund").8 The emergence of such regulations has made it excru-
ciatingly clear to industry that environmental protection will soon dic-
tate every facet of the product life cycle, from the manufacturing
process to disposal-that is, from "cradle to grave."9
.1985, § 1, at 1, 40 [hereinafter Bishop, Jersey Blazing]. New Jersey was also the first
.state to establish the State Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Commission to find appro-
priate'locations for new waste-reduction facilities. Id.; see also Gordon Bishop, Scien-
tists Seek 'Perfect' Incinerator to Eliminate Dioxin From Wastes, NEWARK STAR-
LEDGER, Dec. 5, 1985, at 1, 18 [hereinafter Bishop, Scientists Seek Incinerator].
7. Section 107(a) of CERCLA imposes liability for "damages for injury to, de-
struction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing
such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from... a release" of a hazardous substance.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1988). Natural resource damages under CERCLA
§ 107(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1988), may be measured either as the decrease in eco-
nomic and aesthetic value of the resource or as the cost of restoration and rehabilita-
tion. Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 675-76 (D. Id. 1986). See also
Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.10-.93 (1994); 53 Fed. Reg.
9772 (1988) (amending subsections 11.18 and 11.41).
Natural resource damage assessment ("NRDA") regulations arepromulgated pur-
suant to CERCLA § 301(c). 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(1) (1988). "Natural resources" are
defined to include "water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such re-
sources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise con-
trolled by the United States . . . any State or local government, [or] any foreign
government .... ." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (1988).
For a discussion of the NRDA under CERCLA, see Alaska Sport Fishing Ass'n v.
Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 1994); Thomas A. Grigalunas & James J. Opaluch,
Assessing Liability for Damages Under CERCLA: A New Approach for Providing
Incentives for Pollution Avoidance?, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 509 (1988).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
NRDA damages range from $1 million to $1 billion. Paul D. Boehm, Identifying
Pollutants with Chemical Fingerprinting; A Technical Tool for Environmental Liability,
MASS. LAW. WKLY., Dec. 20, 1993, at 4 (giving examples of current NRDA costs).
The average cost of a single Superfund site cleanup is estimated to be $8 to $10 mil-
lion. R. Lisle Baker & Michael J. Markoff, By.Products Liability: Using Common
Law Private Actions to Clean Up Hazardous Waste Sites, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
99, 101 n.14 (1986). The cost is soon expected to rise to $40 million. Steven Ferrey,
The New Wave: Superfund Allocation Strategies and Outcomes, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA)
790 (Aug. 26, 1994). See also 'Chemical Fingerprinting' Comes of Age, E&P ENV'T,
Jan. 7, 1994,. available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Comes of
Age]; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1353 (4th Cir. 1987) (cit-
ing Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 F.2d 109 (Okla. 1962), cert. de-
nied, 375 U.S. 906 (1963)). The cost of dumping barrels containing hazardous waste in
an illegal manner is estimated to be 75g per barrel while the cost of extracting and
removing the waste is $2000 per barrel. Jon Nordheimer, Residue of Fear Remains as
Toxins Are Removed, N.Y..TIMES, Nov. 6, 1994, § 1, at 56.
9. See, e.g., Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. United States EPA, 673 F.
Supp. 1043, 1046 (D. Kan. 1987) ("RCRA established federal standards and require-:
ments for solid and hazardous waste disposal, regulating all stages of hazardous waste
management from generation to final disposal,... (i.e., cradle to .grave)..
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Commensurate with the advancing regulatory scheme, technology
has improved dramatically, and scientific understanding of chemical
pollutants has undergone fundamental refinements. Chemical analy-
sis techniques are now more than a thousand times more sensitive
than they were when the nation's basic environmental law, the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"), 10 was promul-
gated. For instance, hazardous chemicals migrating through the
environment can now be discerned in parts per quadrillion," although
current regulations generally cut off at the parts per million level.' 2
The impact of hazardous chemical exposure can now be tracked by
examining chromosome damage in human tissue.' 3 Toxic residues
10. NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370(d) (1988). The congressional declaration of
national environmental policy reads:
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the in-
terrelations of all components of the natural environment, particularly the
profound influences of population growth, high-density urbanization, indus-
trial expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding technological
advances and recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and
maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and development
of man, declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government
to use all practicable means ... to create and maintain conditions under
which man and nature can exist in productive harmony ....
Id. § 4331(a).
11. Regarding airborne pollutants, "pp" or "parts per" indicates the concentration
of the suspended substance in the form of a molecular ratio; regarding solid pollu-
tants, it indicates the weight ratio. Carl B. Meyer, Note, The Environmental Fate of
Toxic Waste, the Certainty of Harm, Toxic Torts, and Toxic Regulation, 19 ENVTL. L.
321, 323 n.4 (1P88) [hereinafter Meyer, Fate of Toxic Wastes]. Until 1972, the most
sensitive instruments could measure chemical components at parts per thousand.
Since then, technological improvements yielded measurements at parts per million.
Bishop, Jersey Blazing, supra note 6, at 41. Today, instruments can measure one part
per quadrillion, that is, 1 in 1,000,000,000,000,000-an impractical measurement, ac-
cording to scientists. Gordon Bishop, Jersey Research Center Studies Health Risks of
Toxic Exposure, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, Dec. 6, 1985, at 1, 53 [hereinafter Bishop,
Jersey Research Center].
12. E.g., 7 C.F.R. § 29.427 (1994) (expressing the limit. of pesticide residue stan-
dards in weights of one part per million); 40 C.F.R. § 180.101-.472 (1994) (limiting
tolerance levels for pesticides in scale of one part per million); 40 C.F.R. §§ 465.11-.35
(1994) (limiting effluent levels for coil coating point source emissions in scale of one
part per million).
13. The process, known as DNA adduct, examines what happens when toxic
chemicals bind'to DNA. Bishop, Jersey Research Center, supra note 11, at 53. The
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry drafted a plan to maintain a regis-
try of toxic exposure victims as required by Congress under SARA. Draft Plan for
Identifying Subjects for Toxics Registry Issued by Health Agency, 18 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 2047 (Jan. 22, 1988). The National Exposure Registry, a focal point for col-
lecting and maintaining permanent records of each exposure, "'provide[s] service to
registrants and . . . facilitate[s] the development of new scientific knowledge'" by
evaluating how the exposure affects the victim's health and screening exposed groups
for signs of disease. Id. at 2048. The registry concentrates on groups whose exposure
is associated with a Superfund site, but accommodates others, such as victims of occu-
pational exposure or chemical spills. Id.
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found in the adipose tissue'4 of environmental injury victims can now
be traced to their industrial emission sources.'5 Toxic chemicals pol-
luting underground water supplies can now be detected by highly sen-
sitive sonar equipment, 16 while alternative decontamination methods
are being developed. 17 Previously undetectable levels of toxins can
now be measured in common household items once considered harm-
less, such as paper products.18
In one of the most formidable developments in the field of environ-
mental technology, chemical pollutants can now be "fingerprinted" to
determine their origins. Through a process known as Advanced
Chemical Fingerprinting ("ACF"), pollutants at environmental disas-
ter sites can now be isolated and analyzed with sufficient precision to
14. The EPA examines human fat tissue to track exposure levels to toxic sub-
stances. Marjorie Sun, Fat Survey Trimmed in Lean Budget; National Human Adipose
Tissue Survey, 239 SCIENCE 343 (1988). Based on the findings, the EPA may ban or
restrict certain hazardous chemical uses. Id. About 10,000 tissue specimens dating
back to the early 1970s have lead to the regulation of DDT, dioxin, and
polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs"), among others. Id. EPA studies reveal that
Americans carry several dozen man-made chemicals, some carcinogenic, in fat tissue
and in the fat of mothers' milk. Commoner, supra note 1, at 52. See also Future
Monitoring Program Will Include Regional Data Centers, EPA Official Says, 14 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 101 (May 20, 1983) (reporting that while toxic air pollution has signifi-
cantly been reduced, "many people are still exposed to emissions of criteria pollutants
from uncontrolled or partly controlled sources").
15. Meyer, Fate of Toxic Wastes, supra note 11, at 323 & n.6 (citing CARL B.
MEYER, INDOOR AIR QUALITY 156 (1984); Ahn v. Meadow Gold Dairies-Hawaii, No.
76335 (1st Cir. 1986), reported in 30 L. Rep. (ATLA) 234 (June 1987) (alleging in a
suit against two dairy processors to recover damages allegedly resulting from
purchased milk that contained the pesticide heptachlor in excess of the level permit-
ted by the Food and Drug Administration, that farmers applied the pesticide to pine-
apple leaves, which then traveled to the milk of cows that consumed the leaves, to
mothers who drank the cow milk, and finally to the body of an in utero infant, which
after birth also drank its mother's milk that contained the pesticide).
16. Advanced ultra-sonic techniques, similar to that used by the Navy to search
and track submarines, can detect the spread of underground pollution plumes.
Gordon Bishop, New Jersey Leading the Way in Toxic Waste Research, NEWARK
STAR-LEDGER, Dec. 16, 1985, at 1 [hereinafter Bishop, New Jersey Leading the Way].
A pollution "plume" occurs when hazardous substances begin to spread in a body of
water (or migrate through soil). Id. The nation's water supplies, 25% to 35% of
which have been tainted by improper waste disposal,-contain poisonous organic com-
pounds and deadly heavy metals such as mercury, cadmium, and lead. Il Such ad-
vanced techniques replace traditional monitoring methods that sampled water by
drilling hundreds of holes at depths ranging from 10 feet to thousands of feet and
testing the water at varying depth levels. Id
17. The EPA's Superfund Innovative Technology Evaluation program, in partner-
ship with private and public entities, develops new technologies to accelerate clean-
ups, decrease costs, and prevent pollution. For example, contaminated water tables
and soil, for example, are treated by pumping out the water and vapors, and volatile
organic compounds in the water are removed using granular activated carbon. Inno-
vative Cleanup Technology is Demonstrated at McClellan AFB, PR N~wswire, Oct. 6,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
18. See, e.g., Witnesses Say Limiting Formation of Dioxin Would Avert Costly
Cleanups, Sludge Problems, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1658 (Dec. 16, 1988) (dioxin de-
tected in unbleached paper).
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diagnose their source. 19 Since every manufacturer generates a slightly
different combination of elements in its products, one manufacturer's
chemical can be distinguished from another manufacturer's version of
the same substance.20 ACF capitalizes on the subtle variations of sim-
ilar substances, produced by different manufacturers to reveal the
maker's identity.
The impact of ACF is profound: with more than 43,000 chemical
compounds in commercial production in the United States,21 and
more than 1000 new additions introduced each year,22 the impact of
accurate fingerprinting techniques has resounding implications for the
chemical industry. Any chemical that causes more than one death per
million, the federal risk standard for protecting human health, is sub-
ject to regulation.23 Once a substance falls into the federal environ-
mental regulatory, scheme, the manufacturer, and virtually any entity
that. comes into contact with the substance at any time during its life
cycle, may be subject to liability for its environmental mismanage-
ment.24 If the substance is hazardous, any party who generates, trans-
ports, treats, stores, or disposes of that substance may be liable for
environmental damage due to impermissible disposal, treatment, or
storage practices. 25 If the substance is found to have caused physical
injury to a person or community, there may be separate and addi-
tional tort liabilities.26  In all of these situations, the inability to
pinpoint the source of the offending substance presents a significant
obstacle to environmental justice. ACF, where applicable, traces a di-
rect line from the offending substance to the manufacturer, placing
responsibility for environmental injury at the door of the polluter.27
19. See infra part III.
20.. Meyer, Fate of Toxic Wastes, supra note 11, at 369.
21. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980), reprinted in 1 SENATE COMM.
ON ENV'T & PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, & LIABILITY ACT OF
1980 (SUPERFUND), PUBLIC LAW 96-510, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., at 309-10 (Comm.
Print 1983) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CERCLA].
22. In 1900, 400,000 compounds were listed in the Chemistry, Abstract Service
("CAS"). The 1985 tally cataloged 6 million, with approximately 1000 added to the
CAS list each year. Gordon Bishop, Coal Ash Used to Neutralize Liquid Toxic
Wastes, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, Dec. 4, 1985, at 1, 22 [hereinafter Bishop, Coal Ash].
23. Bishop, Jersey Research Center, supra note 11, at 53. See also Aim Says
Cleanup Plans Assuming Death Risk Greater Than One in One Million Should Be
Weighed, 14 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2270, 2270 (Apr. 20, 1984) (discussing the EPA's "one-
in-one-million risk level," a "conservative measure" of the maximum allowable risk to
human health of hazardous substances).
24. See infra discussion in part II.
25. See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6986 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); CERCLA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
26. See generally Meyer, Fate of Toxic Wastes, supra note 11 (exploring the effect
of advances in analytical chemistry on theories of tort liability and remedies in toxic
exposure cases).
27. See infra discussion in part III.
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In addition, ACF will also have repercussions in the petrochemical
..industry. As a class, petroleum and refined oil products combine to
form the single largest source of chemical contamination in the na-
tion.28 The petrochemical industry produces approximately 265 mil-
lion metric tons of hazardous waste annually.29 Toxic chemicals 30
account for approximately one percent (amounting to 2,650,000 met-
ric tons) of the hazardous material.3' Nearly one third of this waste is
released through mismanagement into the environment.32 Moreover,
most of the "managed" waste is injected underground, sometimes into
water systems, causing long-term damage to the environment.33 Much
of this waste has become fodder for Superfund sponsored cleanups.34
When identifying the culprits at Superfund sites, ACF can offer irrefu-
28. Dan Rosenfeld, Toxic 'Fingerprinting' May Help Investigators, BOSTON Bus.
J., July 2, 1993, § 1, at 9. Petroleum wastes consist of numerous carcinogens, including
benzene. Id.
29. Commoner, supra note 1, at 52.
30. A substance is considered toxic if it has the effect or character of a poison.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1492 (6th ed. 1990). Because the degree of toxicity de.-
pends upon the capacity of a substance to cause injury when it comes into contact
with a susceptible site in or on the body, no formal legal definition of "toxicity" exists.
Theoretically, anything can be toxic in large enough quantities. TSCA applies its test-
ing requirements to any "chemical substance or mixture [that] may present an unrea-
sonable risk of injury to health or the environment." 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(1)(A)(i)
(1988). The, term "chemical substance" means any organic or inorganic substance,
including elements or substances that are the result of chemical reactions, except:
mixtures; pesticides (as defined by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenti-
cide Act ("FIFRA"), 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); tobacco or tobacco
products; source material; special nuclear material or byproduct material (as defined
by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014, 2071, 2091 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)); any article that is sold and subject to tax as a firearm under I.R.C. § 4181
(1982); and any food, food additive, drug, cosmetic, or device defined under the Fed-
eral Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), 15
U.S.C. § 2602(2) (1988).
31. Commoner, supra note 1, at 52.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. At the time of CERCLA's passage, the EPA estimated that as many as 30,000
to 50,000 inactive and uncontrolled hazardous waste sites existed in the United States,
about 20% to 30% of which contained wastes created by off-site generators. Hazard-
ous and Toxic Waste Disposal: Joint Hearings on S. 1341 and S. 1480 Before the Sub-
comms. on Environmental Pollution and Resource Protection of the Senate Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter Joint Hear-
ings]; H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 18 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120. The EPA estimated that cleanup of the 1200 to 2000 most
dangerous sites would cost $13.1 billion to $22.1 billion. Id. The number of
Superfund sites has risen to 1191 with cleanup costs averaging $25 to $30 million per
site. Sandy Shore, Environmental Detectives Track Down Polluters; Superfund Firms
Try to Reduce Their Liability for Cleanup by Finding Other Responsibility for Con-
tamination, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1995, at B5. Financial and other constraints have
prevented the cleanup of all but six Superfund sites, well below expectations. Baker
& Markoff, supra note 8, at 99 & n.3. Only a fraction of the sites that threaten public
health can be responded to solely with Superfund monies. Id. Less that one-third of
the 6000 to 7000 hazardous waste sites will warrant federal or private cleanup action.
Id.
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table evidence of liability and, in certain circumstances, may provide a
feasible basis upon which to apportion liability among responsible
parties.35
Attaching the financial burden of environmental restoration on re-
sponsible parties is a primary goal of federal environmental laws.36 To
that end, the ability to reveal a waste's pedigree makes ACF a valua-
ble tool for the justice system. However, the utility of fingerprinting
technology is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the truly cul-
pable parties may be brought to justice. Alternatively, defendants
may use 'the fingerprinting process to shield themselves from liability,
leaving an injured party with no recompense. In Superfund actions,
potentially responsible parties ("PRPs") may use fingerprinting evi-
dence to avoid cleanup costs, leaving the EPA the costly and time-
intensive, chore of identifying and bringing suit against other PRPs.
Thus, the question is whether fingerprinting will be more effective as a
sword to deter pollution or as a shield to protect careless hazardous
waste management practices.
This Note explores the' need for ACF in. hazardous waste liability
under CERCLA and its implications for future Superfund litigation.
Part I outlines CERCLA's regulatory scheme. Part II examines the
areas where the application of ACF would have the greatest impact:
joint and several liability, contribution, causation, and apportionment.
Part III defines and discusses the origins of advanced chemical finger-
printing. Part IV discusses the application of ACF to overcome
travails in the regulatory scheme and concludes that technological
progress made in the area of chemical sensing can and should trans-
form the courts' approach to future CERCLA litigation.
I. THE REGULATORY PROCESS UNDER CERCLA
In response to the nation's growing hazardous waste disposal prob-
lem, Congress enacted CERCLA, also known as Superfund.37 The
35. See infra part III.
36. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY OF CERCLA, supra note 21, at 320 (stating that the goal of the Senate bill was
"assuring that those who caused chemical harm bear the costs of that harm").
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), as amended by SARA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9621 note-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). For discussions of CERCLA's stat-
utory scheme, see Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980, 45 Bus. LAW. 923 (1990); Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation,
99 HARV. L. REV. 1458 (1986) (published before 1986 amendments).I CERCLA was enacted primarily due to concern over the Love Canal disaster.
Joint Hearings, supra note 34, at 7 (testimony of.Thomas C. Jorling, Assistant Admin-
istrator of the EPA). Between 1942 and 1953, Hooker Chemical & Plastics Co. buried
21,800 tons (more than 40 million pounds) of industrial wastes on a 16-acre site in
Niagara Falls, New York. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 722 F.
Supp. 960, 961 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) [hereinafter Hooker 1]. Conforming to typical prac-
tices of the day, Hooker covered the waste with a layer of clay. United States v.
19951
260 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VI
Superfund name derives from CERCLA's $8.5 billion "Hazardous
Substance Response Trust Fund,"38 which is financed by levies on gen-
erators of hazardous waste products to support the cleanup of inactive
dump sites, many of which were fermenting before the dangers of haz-
ardous waste disposal were widely recognized.39 CERCLA, as
amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 ("SARA"), 40 is intended to facilitate cleanup efforts in every
conceivable area where hazardous substances come to be located 4
and to place the ultimate financial burden upon those responsible for
Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 552 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) [hereinafter
Hooker I1]. Hooker sold the property to the Niagara Falls Board of Education for
one dollar. Hooker I, 722 F. Supp. at 961. Schools and homes were built there and, in
the mid 1970s, chemicals began seeping into residential basements. Id. at 962. Health
problems, including birth defects, miscarriages, epilepsy, and liver abnormalities were
found in local residents: See generally Gerald B. Silverman Love Canal: A Retrospec-
tive, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 835 (Sept. 15, 1989); Richard L. Stroup, Environmental
Policy, REGULATION, 1988 No. 3, at 43. In 1978, the New York Commissioner of
Health declared a health emergency and many families were required to relocate.
Hooker II, 722 F. Supp. at 962. Thereafter, President Jimmy Carter declared Love
Canal a federal emergency. Id. at 962. For further discussion on the Love Canal
debacle, see S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess. 13 (1980), reprinted in LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF CERCLA, supra note 21, at 320; Silverman, supra; Richard L.
Stroup, Hazardous Waste Policy: A Property Rights Perspective, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA)
868 (Sept. 22, 1989).
38. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(11) (1988) (referring to 26 U.S.C. § 9507,
which creates the Hazardous Substance Superfund).
39. CERCLA regulations "plug the gap" left by'the federal government's then-
existing environmental regulation scheme. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125; S. REP. No. 848,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CERCLA,
supra note 21, at 318. Unlike RCRA, CERCLA applies to orphaned dump sites, not
active disposal facilities, and its provisions apply retroactively, not prospectively. See,
e.g., Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. United States EPA, 673 F. Supp. 1043, 1046
(D. Kan. 1987). While RCRA authorizes the EPA to respond to hazardous waste
emergencies, it does not authorize the immediate governmental cleanup action avail-
able under CERCLA, even when the site poses an imminent threat to human health
or the environment. Compare RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1988) (authorizing. EPA to
issue administrative orders or bring suit compelling responsible parties to take correc-
tive action with regard to the hazardous waste) with CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604
(1988 & Supp. V 1993) (authorizing the undertaking of cleanup action with regard to
the hazardous waste). See also United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1269-
70 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing alternative response actions).
. Because CERCLA was the product of'an unusually arduous process of political
compromise, it is frequently derided by the courts as a model of imprecise legislative
draftsmanship. E.g., Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 363 (1986) (reviewing CER-
CLA's legislative history); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (CERCLA "leaves much to be desired from a syntactical standpoint"); Amoco
Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting CERCLA's "well-
deserved notoriety for vaguely-drafted provisions"). See also Frank P. Grad, A Legis-
lative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-
bility ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 1-2 (1982).
40. SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended in
scattered sections at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
41. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988) (defining "facility").
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the danger created by such sites.4' CERCLA authorizes the Presi-
dent, through the EPA as agent,43 to undertake emergency cleanup
measures when it determines that an abandoned site threatens human
health and the environment. 4 The EPA may recover certain costs in-
curred in cleanup and containment measures from designated classes
of persons45 or seek to compel a party to perform its own cleanup.'
Finally, the EPA may seek emergency injunctive relief to prevent fur-
ther improper disposal activities.47
:CERCLA's power is spearheaded by the "response authorities" of
section 104, which empower the EPA to undertake emergency cleanup
measures when it determines that a hazardous waste site presents or
may present "an imminent and substantial danger to public health or
the environment." 48 The response authorities function in tandem with
the liability provision, section 107, which allows the EPA to sue PRPs
for reimbursement of the Superfund for emergency cleanup, removal,
and containment actions carried out under section 104.49 At its discre-
tion provided under section 106, the EPA may issue an administrative
order or seek a court order requiring a PRP to conduct its own re-
sponse activities as instructed by the EPA. ° The final blow is struck
by a triad of penalty provisions that, in combination,- provide that the
recipient of an administrative order may not challenge its issuance or
42. See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF CERCLA, supra note 21, at 320 (stating that the goal of the Senate bill
was "assuring that those who caused chemical-harm bear the costs of that harm"). See
also Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st
Cir. 1986) ("Congress intended that [under CERCLA] those responsible for problems
caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for reme-
dying the harmful conditions they created."); Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. United
States EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 886 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Congress wanted the parties responsi-
ble for the hazardous conditions to perform the abatement."), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1115 (1986).
43. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1987), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. § 9615 note (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (delegating the President's functions under
CERCLA to the Administrator of the EPA).
44. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988) ("Whenever any hazardous sub-
stance is released... into the environment ... the President is authorized to... take
any other response measure... which the President deems necessary to protect the
public health or welfare of the environment.").
45. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (defining persons who are covered by CERCLA).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (authorizing the President to issue cleanup orders).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (authorizing the President to respond to the release of a
hazardous substance in any manner consistent with the national contingency plan at
any time).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (placing liability for removal costs, remedial action, injury to
natural resources, and costs of health assessments carried out under 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(i) on responsible parties).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 9606. The categories of PRPs listed under § 107 are also parties
subject to cleanup orders under § 106. See, e.g., United States v. Hardage, 663 F.
Supp. 1280 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (recognizing applicability of a § 106(a) administrative
order to parties described in § 107(a)).
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content unless and until an enforcement action is brought by the
EPA." By that time, the PRP might have accrued civil penalties
amounting to as much as $25,000 perday52 and treble damages for
cleanup costs incurred by the Superfund53 if the PRP cannot prove
"sufficient cause" 4 for not complying with the order. Moreover, Con-
gress has directed courts to uphold the EPA's actions, under the au-
thority conferred by the President, unless proven to be "arbitrary and
capricious."55 Courts have buttressed CERCLA's arsenal with a lib-
eral interpretation to effectuate its goals,56 and have generally given
51. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (providing no pre-enforcement review of a § 106 order).
See, e.g., Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 314-15 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding no
pre-enforcement review); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Browner, 848 F. Supp. 1369,
1374 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (noting that CERCLA pre-enforcement review provisions have
been uniformly upheld); Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. United States EPA, 777 F.2d
882, 887 (3d Cir. 1985) (denying pre-enforcement review on grounds that CERCLA
provides for full hearing when EPA sues for recovery costs); cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1115 (1986).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1). The statute provides in relevant part:
Any person who, without sufficient cause, willfully violates, or fails or re-
fuses to comply with, any order of the President under subsection (a) of this
section may, in an action brought in the appropriate United States district
court to enforce such order, be fined not more, than $25,000 for each day in
which such violation occurs or such failure to comply continues.
Id.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3). The statute provides in relevant part:
If any person who is liable for a release or threat of release of a hazardous
substance fails without sufficient cause to properly provide removal or reme-
dial action upon order of the President pursuant to section 9604 or 9606 of
this title, such person may be liable to the United States for punitive dam-
ages in an amount at least equal to, and not more than three times, the
amount of any costs incurred by the Fund as a result of such failure to take
proper action.
Id.
54. "Sufficient cause" as used in CERCLA § 107(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3), has
been constitutionally interpreted to mean that treble damages may not be assessed if
the party opposing such damages can establish that it had a reasonable basis for be-
lieving that it was not liable under CERCLA or that the required response action was
inconsistent with the national contingency plan. Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. United
States EPA, 812 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1987). The Eighth Circuit cautioned that the evalu-
ation of a defendant's belief must be based on the objective evidence of the reasona-
bleness and good faith of that belief: "Given the importanceof EPA orders to the
success of the CERCLA program, courts should carefully scrutinize assertions of 'suf-
ficient cause' and accept such a defense only where a party can demonstrate by objec-
tive evidence the reasonableness and good faith of a challenge to an EPA order." Id.
at 391 n.11.
55. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 96130)(2). The statute provides:
In considering objections raised in any judicial action under this chapter,
the court shall uphold the President's decision in selecting the response ac-
tion unless the objecting party can demonstrate, on the administrative rec-
ord, that the decision was arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in
accordance with law.
Id.
56. E.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1197 (2d Cir. 1992) ("In
CERCLA, Congress enacted a broad remedial statute designed to enhance the au-
thority of the EPA. . . ."); United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832,
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short shrift to facially valid constitutional due process challenges in
deference to environmental fastidiousness.57
A. Environmental Hygiene Under CERCLA
The National Contingency Plan ("NCP") 58 governs "response ac-
tions," which consist of short-term removal and long-term remedia-
tion actions.59 Sites that have been included on the National Priorities
List ("NPL") 60 may be subject to EPA removal and remedial action,61
838 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[CERCLA] provisions should be construed broadly to avoid
frustrating the legislative purpose.") (citing Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922
F.2d 1240, 1247 (6th Cir. 1991); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc.,
•889 F.2d 1146, 1150 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that CERCLA is a "broad response and
reimbursement statute"); Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County,
659 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (D. Del. 1987) (acknowledging CERCLA's broad purposes).
57. E.g., Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 316 (2d Cir; 1986) ("[I]t is
plain that, there is no constitutional violation if the imposition of penalties is subject
to judicial discretion, and the enforcement provisions contain a good faith excep-
tion."); Employee Ins. of Wausau v. Browner, 848 F. Supp. 1369, 1374 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
("the provision for pre-enforcement review under CERCLA has been repeatedly
challenged, and courts have uniformly upheld its constitutionality"); Solid State Cir-
,cuits, 812 F.2d at 389-90 (rejecting plaintiffs' contention that the choice between com-
pliance and potential treble liability effectively prevents all challenges to EPA orders).
Cf. Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that CERCLA
provisions providing property owner with notice and opportunity for hearing de-
prived owner of property without due process).
58. National Oil & Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R.
§ 300 (1994). The NCP provides criteria and procedures for the selection of the most
cost-effective and environmentally sound alternative for remedying a Superfund site
based on considerations of cost, engineering, and the health and environmental goals
of the legislation. 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1, .3 (1994). See also CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9605
(1988) (enumerating minimum content requirements of the NCP); New York v. Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1046-47 (2d Cir. 1985) (discussing applicability of NCP in
CERCLA response actions).
59. Section 101(25) of CERCLA defines the terms "respond" and "response" to
include "remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action ... includ[ing] enforcement
actions related thereto." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1988). "Remedial actions" are long-
term or permanent measures to remedy the damaged environment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(24). "Removal actions" are generally those intended to be short-term efforts
to remove the hazardous substances from the area. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23).
Response actions begin with remedial investigations to pinpoint the cause of a re-
lease that is believed to present an imminent and substantial danger to public health.
United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F.Supp. 391,396 (W.D. Mo. 1985). An
endangerment assessment ("EA") evaluates the potential impacts of a site on public
health, welfare, and the environment and a feasibility study evaluates alternative tech-
nologies and remedial actions for a site, based on the needs identified in the EA. Id.
Accord United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1271 (3d Cir. 1993). See also
United States v. Witco Corp., 853 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (discussing distinction
between recoverable and nonrecoverable response costs); Arizona v. Motorola, Inc.,
805 F. Supp. 742 (D. Ariz. 1992) (discussing costs recoverable under remedial action
plan).
60. The NPL is promulgated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B).
61. To prevent improvident disbursements, § 104 forbids Superfund expenditures
for remedial actions unless the state in which the release occurs agrees to pay a por-
tion of the federal remedial costs and to maintain the cleanup actions initiated by the
federal government. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3). Unless a need for immediate action is
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while sites not included on the NPL may be subject to removal actions
only.62 Whether or not a site is listed on the NPL, any party, including
individuals, may be liable for cleanup of a hazardous waste site and
may sue PRPs for reimbursement.63 Only expenditures deemed to be
"response costs" will be recoverable.6' The obligation to clean up a
Superfund site is ,triggered only by an administrative order or a court
order.65 Challenges to the EPA's authority to recover response costs
for activities that were lawful prior to the enactment of Superfund
have consistently failed.66
B. A Penny in a Landfill: Hazardous Waste Defined
CERCLA applies to an ample array of substances listed in other
titles and sections of the federal environmental laws. 67 One defendant
underscored the absurd consequences of CERCLA's expansive defini-
found, § 104 also bars Superfund expenditures after 12 months have elapsed from the
date of initial response. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(1).
62. See, e.g., Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1046 (finding that the NPL listing is a
requirement only for remedial actions and not for removal actions).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (liability for cleanup costs incurred by the federal
government, states, and Indian tribes); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (liability for cleanup
costs incurred by any other party). A private citizen plaintiff faces a greater burden
than a government plaintiff. Government plaintiffs may be reimbursed for response
costs that 'are "not inconsistent" with the NCP, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A), while pri-
vate response costs must be "consistent with the national contingency plan" to be
recoverable. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). See Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co.,
866 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 851 (W.D. Mo. 1984), modified, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). Accord O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706,
728 (D.R.I. 1988), aff'd, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071
(1990).
64. "Response costs" include money spent on investigating, monitoring, testing,
and evaluating the situation at a site, in addition to actual removal of the hazardous
waste. United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1332 (E.D. Pa. 1983). "Response
costs" are distinct from economic losses, such as personal injury or personal property
damages. "Congress, in enacting CERCLA, intended to provide a vehicle for clean-
ing up and preserving the environment from the evils of improperly disposed of haz-
ardous substances rather than a new font of law on which private parties could base
claims for personal and property injuries." Artesian Water Co. v Government of New
Castle County, 605 F. Supp. 1348, 1357 n.10 (D. Del. 1985). See also Polcha v. AT & T
Nassau Metals, 837 F. Supp. 94, 96 (M.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that recoverable costs
under CERCLA do not include personal injury damages). For further discussion of
the types of cleanup costs that are recoverable, see Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.,
849 F. Supp. 931 (D.N.J. 1994); Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986); Colorado v.
Asarco, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 822 (D. Colo. 1985); New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F.
Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 174 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding
that rational legislative purpose satisfies due process for retroactive application of
CERCLA), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d
at 732-34 (holding that retroactive application does not violate due process); United
States v. Marisol, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 833, 845 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (findifig plaintiff's asser-
tion of ex post facto.violation insufficient as a matter of law).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). CERCLA § 101(14) defines "hazardous substance" as:
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tion of hazardous waste by arguing that, because copper is a prohib-
ited toxic pollutant, CERCLA liability attaches when a-penny is
dropped into a landfill. 61 Generally, the EPA lists as hazardous only
specific wastes that are either "acutely hazardous or possess high
levels of toxic constituents." 69 The definition of hazardous substances
,encompasses more than waste products; if the court determines .that
the manufacturer was disposing of the substance within the meaning
of the statute, primary manufacturing products, chemicals, or products
sold for use in a manufacturing process may be considered hazardous
waste under CERCLA.7 ° Even trace amounts of hazardous sub-
stances can trigger Superfund liability because CERCLA does not
rely on concentration levels. 71 While there are no quantitative re-
quirements for determining liability once a site is found to be contami-
(A) [A]ny substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of title
33, (B) any element, compound, nixture, solution, or substance designated
pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the
characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid
Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. 6921] (but not including any waste the regula-
tion of which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. 6901, et seq.]
has been suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed
under section 1317(a) of title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under
section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C. 7412], and (F) any imminently
hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Adminis-
trator has taken action pursuant to section 2606 of Title 15. The term does
not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is
not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance
under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph ....
Id.
68. Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1340. But see United.States v. Atlas Minerals & Chems.,
Inc., 797 F. Supp. 411, 418 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (noting that the courts' ability to consider
equitable factors protects against such drastic results).
69. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. United States EPA, 976 F.2d 2, 8 (D.C.
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1961 (1993). A substance may be considered haz-
ardous if it carries one of the following four properties: ignitability, corrosivity, reac-
tivity, or toxicity. 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.20-.24 (1994) (describing characteristics of
hazardous waste).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1384, 1386-
90 (S.D.. Ia. 1988) (finding pesticide manufacturer liable for "disposal" a't site where
pesticide ingredients were sent to be formulated and packaged), aff'd in part & rev'd
in part, 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F.
Supp. 162, 237-39 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (denying summary judgment to producers, of haz-
ardous substances who claimed the substances were not covered by CERCLA be-
cause they had sold, rather than disposed of, the substances to a waste facility to be.
used for the treatment of waste). But see Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Mater-
ials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651, 654-56 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that suppliers of chemicals
for treating wood were not liable under CERCLA for response costs incurred by the
wood treatment facility), aff'd on other grounds, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
71. Joel Schneider, Beware Superfund Liability, OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS, Aug.
1990, at 59. For a waste to be hazardous under RCRA, it.must meet certain concen-
tration levels. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.11(a) (1994). Generally, hazardous substances
under RCRA must be in a form "capable of posing substantial harm ... if managed
improperly." Hazardous Waste Management Systems; Identification and Listing of
Hazardous Waste, 57 Fed. Reg. 12, 13 (1992).
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nated,71 there are, however, reporting requirements for newly
occurring releases of hazardous substances.73
C. Beasts of Burden: Potentially Responsible Parties
CERCLA embraces a comprehensive catalog of potentially respon-
sible parties ("PRPs"). Virtually any person along the chain of the
hazardous substance life cycle, from production to disposal, may
shoulder liability for cleanup costs and damages resulting from im-
proper management of the waste. CERCLA establishes four classes
of PRPs: (i) current owners and operators of facilities at which release'
or threatened release of hazardous substances is possible; (ii) past
owners and operators of such facilities; (iii) anyone who arranged for
disposal or treatment of hazardous substances at these facilities ("gen-
72. See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 669 (5th Cir. 1989)
("[Tihe plain statutory language fails to impose any quantitative requirement on the
term hazardous substance."); City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 744 F. Supp. 474, 483
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("[L]iability under CERCLA attaches regardless of the concentra-
tion of the hazardous substances present in a defendant's waste."); United States v.
Western Processing Co., 734 F. Supp. 930, 936 (W.D. Wash. 1990) ("The concentra-
tion or amount of hazardous substance is irrelevant as the statutory definition con-
tains no threshold requirement."); Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp, at 238 ("[I1f
Congress had intended the definition of hazardous substances to be contingent upon
the presence of a ... concentration of a hazardous substance, it would have so pro-
vided."); United States v. Carolawn Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124, 2126
(D.S.C. 1984) (stating that CERCLA "simply does not distinguish hazardous sub-
stances on the basis of quantity or concentration"); Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1340 (find-
ing that CERCLA imposes no concentration requirement on the definition of
hazardous substances). But see United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 22 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1736, 1739 (D.N.H. 1984) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss on the
ground that it "did not cause or contribute to cause the disposal of any hazardous
wastes . . .which exceeded the threshold established by the EPA for hazardous
wastes.").
CERCLA contains provisions for de minimis contributors. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g). To
qualify for de minimis status, a PRP must have contributed an amount of hazardous
substances that is minimal in comparison to the total amount at the facility and that is
not significantly more toxic and not of significantly greater hazardous effect than
other hazardous substances at the site. Superfund Program; De Minimis Contributor
Settlements: Request for Public Comment, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,333 (1987); Superfund
Program; De Minimis Contributor Settlements: Notice, 52 Fed. Reg. 43,393 (1987).
See also Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. at 233; Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1339.
73. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9602(b). The statute's reporting requirements provide
in relevant part:
Unless and until superseded by regulations establishing a reportable quan-
tity ["RQ"] under subsection (a) of this section for any hazardous substance
as defined in section 9601(14) of this title, (1) a quantity of one pound, or (2)
for those hazardous substances for which reportable quantities have been
established pursuant to section 1321(b)(4) of Title 33, such reportable quan-
tity, shall be deemed that quantity, the release of which requires notification
pursuant to section 9603(a) or (b) of this title.
Id.
The person in charge of a facility is required to notify the EPA immediately of any
release of a hazardous substance in a quantity equal to or exceeding the RQ for that
substance. 42 U.S.C. § 9603.
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erators"); and (iv) persons who transported hazardous substances to
these facilities ("transporters").74
One of the key points to note about PRPs is that they are defined
by their relationship to the facility or site, not by their relationship to
the waste. In other words, if a defendant is not a responsible party
with respect to the Superfund site, then it cannot be liable.75 Efforts
by PRPs to qualify the stringent statutory language have repeatedly
failed. Courts have rejected arguments to limit liability for absentee
landlords who did not participate in the disposal of waste 76 and off-,
site generators who are no longer dumping it the site 77 Courts have
also declined to restrict the liability of current owners who were not
owners or operators at the time the hazardous wastes were released at
the site and who did not dispose of the wastes.78
CERCLA offers an escape hatch, however, for intermediate owners
who were not owners or operators at the time of disposal- and are not
74. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). The liability provision provides in relevant
part as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of taw...
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, .or arranged with a transporter for transport
for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or pos-
sessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or
incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity
and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of
a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred ... not incon-
sistent with the national contingency plan ...
Id.
75. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 264 n.22 (3d Cir. 1992).
76. E.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding
absentee landlords liable under CERCLA "regardless of their degree of participation
.inthe disposal"). See also United States v. A & N Cleaners & Launderers, Inc., 788 F.
Supp. 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (discussing what constitutes ownership in absence of
title).
77. United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1112 (D.NJ. 1983) ("CERCLA
[§ 106] was intended and should apply to past, off-site generators if the circumstances
indicate an 'imminent and substantial endangerment.' ") [hereinafter Price 1].
78. See, e.g., Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568,
1572 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding that statutory language does not exclude liability of
"present owners or operators of property previously contaminated"); New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043-45 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Prior owners and opera-
tors are liable only if they owned or operated 'at the time of disposal.. ,', this limita-
tion does not apply to current owners."); United States v. Outboard Marine Corp.,
556 F. Supp. 54, 58 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (expanding § 106 application to dump site
owners even though the sites were no longer active).
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current owners or, operators.79 The rule is not entirely dependable,
however, because the word "disposal". has been defined broadly
enough to embrace passive leaking or continuous migration of con-
taminants at a site.8 ° Thus, an intermediate owner who was not an
owner at the time of the initial release may nevertheless be held liable
for cleanup costs due to the contaminant's migration." The definition
of a responsible party hinges upon the authority to control the physi-
cal condition of the hazardous substances of the site. A supplier
whom the court determines to have disposed of its products may be
liable if, while the products were being used by another, the supplier
maintained some degree of ownership or control over them.82 Actual
control is not entirely relevant, the party who possesses the authority
to exercise control over the product or site bears the burden.83
79. Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454, 1457 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (finding that
CERCLA § 107(a)(2) provides for action against prior owners or operators only if
they owned or operated at the time of disposal).
80. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29). CERCLA § 101(29) defines "disposal" by
reference to § 1004 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, which states: -
The term "disposal" means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spill-
ing, leaking or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any.
land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent
thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged
into any waters, including ground waters.
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988).
81. Compare Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir.
1992) (rejecting a "strained reading of 'disposal' which would limit the meaning to
active human conduct") and United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1071 (D.N.J.
1981) (finding that disposal "significantly ... includes in its purview leaking, which
ordinarily occurs not through affirmative action but as a result of inaction or negligent
past actions") [hereinafter Price II], aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982), with United
States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (finding that
disposal does not include passive action) and Ecodyne Corp., 718 F. Supp. at 1457
(finding that "definitional components [of 'disposal'] all have in common the idea that
someone do something with the hazardous substances").
82. Some courts investigate whether suppliers intended to dispose of their prod-
ucts while others rule that subjective intent is not a prerequisite to liability. Distribu-
tors May Need to Defend Themselves in Court, AIR CONDITIONING, HEATING &
REFRIGERATION NEWS, Dec. 9, 1991, at 16. See, e.g., Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex
Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[W]hen a shipper is not trying to arrange for
disposal of hazardous waste, but is arranging for the delivery of a useful product, he is
not a responsible party within the meaning of the statute .... ").
83. Nurad, 966 F.2d at 842 ("[T]enant defendants need not have exercised actual
control in order to qualify as operators under section 9607(a)(2) so long as the author-
ity to control the facility was present."). Accord Northwest Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. At-
lantic Research Corp., 847 F. Supp. 389, 397 (E.D. Va. 1994) ("The 'authority to
control' standard is sensibly based on the notion that an occupier or user of a facility
with authority to control the facility is in a position to prevent or abate environmental
harm."); North Miami v. Berger, 828 F. Supp. 401, 410 (E.D. Va. 1993) (recognizing
the exercise of actual control as clear evidence of authority to control). Cf. General
Elec. Co. v. Aamco Transmission, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that
"arranger" must have obligation, not mere ability, to exercise control over hazardous
waste disposal).
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In sum, CERCLA imposes liability on (1) parties who fit the de-
scription of a responsible party in relation to (2) a facility85 (3)
where a release 86 or threatened release 87 of (4) a hazardous sub-
stance88 (5) causes the incurrence of response CoStS. 89 Liability appli-
cable to PRPs other than owners or operators attaches if the site
contains hazardous substances of the sort disposed of by the parties.9°
The release need only be of "a" hazardous substance, not necessarily
one contained in the defendant's waste, and the release must result in
the incurrence of response costs.91 The only required nexus between
an off-site defendant and the site is that the defendant have dumped
its waste there and that the hazardous substances found at the site are
of the same general type handled by the defendant.92
84. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (defining covered persons).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9). Section 101(9) of CERCLA defines "facility" as follows:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (includ-
ing any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit,
pond, lagoon, impoundment, .ditch, landfill; storage container, motor vehicle,
rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance
has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be
located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer use or any
vessel.
Id.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22). Section 101(22) defines "release" as follows:
[A]ny spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging,
injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment
(including the abandonment or discarding* of barrels, containers, and other
closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or con-
taminant), but excludes (A) any release which results in exposure to persons
solely within a workplace, with respect to a claim which such persons may
assert against the employer of-such persons, (B) emissions from the engine
exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, aircraft, vessel, or pipeline pumping
station' engine, (C) release of source, byproduct, or special nuclear material
from a nuclear incident, as those terms are defined in the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 [42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.], if such release is subject to requirements
with respect to financial protection established by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission under section 170 of such Act [42 U.S.C. 2210], or, for the pur-
poses of section 9604 of this title or any other response action, any release of
source byproduct, or special nuclear material from any processing site desig-
nated under section 7912(a)(1) or 7942(a) of this title, and (D) the normal
application of fertilizer.
Id.
87. An owner or operator's lack of expertise in handling hazardous waste, along
with other factors, can amount to a "threatened release." State of New York v.,Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). See supra note 67 (stating the definition of hazardous
substances under CERCLA).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (defining response costs).
90. United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1334 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
91. Id.
92. Id.
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II. THE BLACK HOLE OF CERCLA LIABILITY
A. Strict, Retroactive, and Joint and Several Liability
Liability under CERCLA is strict,93 retroactive,94 and joint and sev-
eral.95 There is a presumption that any responsible party who at any
time had some connection with a Superfund site is liable for cleanup
costs. Liability is triggered by a party's relationship to the site as
owner, operator, transporter, or generator,96 not necessarily by direct
culpability for the contamination. 97 Off-site PRPs may be liable even
if they were unaware of where their substances were eventually de-
posited.98 Liability may attach even if a generator-PRP took reason-
able steps to ensure its wastes were disposed of safely. 9 The courts
only require that plaintiff show that a generator or transporter partici-
93. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32). Section 101(32) provides that liability "shall
be construed to be the standard of liability" under § 311 of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1321. Id. Under § 311, liability is strict. See New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Congress intended that responsible parties
be held strictly liable .... ."). Accord Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas,
Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.,
632 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 843-44 (W.D. Mo. 1984), modified, 810 F.2d 726, cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); Price 1, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1113-14 (D.N.J. 1983); United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 807 (S.D. Ohio 1983). The House and
Senate Reports echo the clear intent to impose strict liability. See S. REP. No. 848,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (980), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CERCLA,
supra note 21, at 320; H. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 33-34, reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6136-37. But see Joseph K. Brenner, Note, Liability for
Generators of Hazardous Waste: The Failure of Existing Enforcement Mechanisms, 69
GEO. L.J. 1047, 1057 (1981) (noting that the final bill'was silent on the subject of strict
liability for generators).
94. See, e.g., Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. at 839 (noting that Con-
gress intended sections 104 and 107(a) to apply retroactively); In re Penn Cent.
Transp. Co., 944 F.2d 164, 165 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889
F.2d 1497, 1506 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990).
95. E.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); J.V. Peters & Co., Inc. v. EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 266 (6th
Cir. 1985); Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. .1563, 1572 (E.D. Pa.
1988); O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 722 (D.R.I. 1988) (citing Violet v. Picillo,
648 F. Supp. 1283, 1290-93 (D.R.I. 1986)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990); United
States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 1987); United States v. Dick-
erson, 640 F. Supp. 448, 451 (D. Md. 1986); Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 576; Price
1, 577 F. Supp. at 1114.
96. See supra part I.C.
97. E.g., Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 169 (stating that plaintiff need not "trace the own-
ership of each generic chemical compound found at a site."). Accord Nurad, Inc. v.
William E. Hooper & Sons.Co., 966 F.2d 837, 846 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 377 (1992).
• 98. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 233-34
(W.D. Mo. 1985) ("[CERCLA] does not require that the generator select the site in
order to be liable."). Accord United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 895 (E.D.N.C.
1985); Missouri v. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 610 F. Supp. 4, 5 (E.D. Mo.
1985).
99. See, e.g., O'Neil, 682 F. Supp. at 722 (attaching liability in spite of defendant's
due diligence in choosing waste transporter); United States v. Marisol, Inc., 725 F.
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pated in the disposal of wastes of the kind found at the contaminated
site. 100  Current owners who have title to only a fraction of the
Superfund property and who did not contribute to the hazardous
waste dumping are not excused.' 0' Once a PRP is ensnared in the
web of CERCLA liability, escape is near impossible.
Strict liability is not absolute. 1°2 There are extremely narrow de-
fenses for releases caused solely by acts of war, acts of God, or actions
or non-actions of unrelated third parties.' 3 SARA adds a defense for
innocent landowners who -did not know and should not reasonably
have known that hazardous substances were dumped on their land at
the time they acquired title or possession.' 04 CERCLA, as modified
Supp. 833, 839-40 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (rejecting defendant's defense of due care when
disposing of waste). Accord Conservation Chem., 619 F. Supp. at'204.
100. United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1333 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Rohm & Haas Co.,.2 F.3d 1265, 1278-79 (3d Cir.
1993) (rejecting one defendant's argument that liability should not be imposed be-
cause it owned only 10% of the site).
102. New York v.'Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985).
103. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). Section 107(b) provides in pertinent part:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person'
otherwise liable who'can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages
resulting therefrom were caused solely by-
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party...; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
Id.
The defenses are construed narrowly. Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 882' F.2d 392,
396 (9th Cir. 1989). The third-party defense applies only when the third party is
neither the defendant's employee or agent, nor one who has a contractual relationship
with the defendant. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3). Defendant must show by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that it acted with due care concerning the hazardous substances
and took precautions against any foreseeable acts or omissions by others. Id. For a
discussion of CERCLA defenses, which have proven largely ineffective, see generally
James R. Deason, Note, Clear as Mud: The Function of the Nitional Contingency Plan
Consistency Requirement in a CERCLA Private Cost-Recovery Action, 28 GA. L.
REV. 555, 568-69 (1994); Daniel E. Feder, The Undefined Parameters of Lessee Liabil-
ity Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA):.A Trap for the Unwary Lender, 19 ENV'rL. L. 257, 276-82 (1988);
Elizabeth A. Glass, Note, Superfund and SARA: Are There any Defenses Left?, 12
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 385, 395-434 (1988); John M. Van Lieshout, Bankers Beware:
Liability of Lending Institutions Under Superfund, 2 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 291, 299
(1989).
104. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35). Section 101(35) provides that a landowner is
considered innocent if he or she exercised due care with the hazardous substance,
took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of third parties, and can estab-
lish (i) the landowner acquired the property without reason to know that any hazard-
ous substance was there; or (ii) the landowner is a government entity that acquired
the property involuntarily or through eminent domain; or (iii) the landowner inher-
ited the property. Id. For a discussion of property owner liability, see L. Jager Smith,
Jr., Note, CERCLA's Innocent Landowner Defense: Oasis or Mirage?, 18 COLuM. J.
ENVTL. L. 155 (1993); Michael A. Bell, Note, The Effect of Superfund Liability on
Property "Owners," 92 W. VA. L. REV. 125 (1989).
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by SARA, itself limits owner and operator liability to those who cur-
rently own or operate, or those who owned or operated at the time of
disposal, exempting intermediate owners and operators who were not
in charge of the site at the time of disposal.1"5 Finally, a PRP who sold
hazardous substances as raw materials or finished products and who
did not intend to dispose of the hazardous materials may avoid
liability.10 6
There is no explicit joint and several liability provision in the
Superfund statute. Rather, Congress left the decision to impose joint
and several liability to judicial discretion. 10 7 Under a theory of joint
and several liability, any responsible party may be strapped with the
entire cleanup bill no matter how small its contribution to the environ-
mental damage.' 0 8 Casting a broad liability net protects the EPA
against the possibility that all PRPs have become insolvent or can
evade identification.
B. Contribution
A party held to be jointly and severally liable under CERCLA has a
right to seek contribution from other PRPs when it believes that it has
assumed a disproportionate share of the cleanup cost under the partic-
ular circumstances."° SARA codifies actions for contribution be-
tween responsible parties,110 a right most courts found implicit in
105. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text
106. See, e.g., Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651,
654-56 (N.D. IIl. 1988) (holding that, under CERCLA, suppliers of chemicals for
wood treatment were not liable for response costs incurred by the wood treatment
facility), aff'd on other grounds, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988). But see United States v.
Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 237-39 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (denying sum-
mary judgment to generators of hazardous substances who claimed that CERCLA
was not applicable to the substances because they were sold, not "disposed of," to a
waste facility to be used for the treatment of waste); United States v. Aceto Agric.
Chems. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1384, 1386-90 (S.D. Ia. 1988) (holding pesticide manufac-
turer liable for CERCLA response costs at contaminated formulator site where man-
ufacturer had transported pesticide ingredients to be formulated and packaged), aff'd
in part & rev'd in part, 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
107. In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 902 n.13 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Con-
gress ... refused to adopt mandatory joint and several liability in order to give the
courts the ability to ameliorate [harsh] results in appropriate cases."). See also O'Neil
v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 179 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990); New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F.
Supp. 1283, 1290 (D.R.I. 1986); Price I, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1114 (D.N.J. 1983); United
States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
108. E.g., United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1279 (3d Cir. 1993)
(rejecting appellant's argument that its ownership of less than 10% of the contami-
nated area should excuse it from joint and.several liability).
109. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g). See also Steven B. Russo, Note, Contribution
Under CERCLA: Judicial Treatment After SARA, 14 COLUM. J. ErNrL. L. 267 (1989).
110. See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 79 (1985), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861 (declaring that SARA "confirms" federal right of con-
tribution under CERCLA). CERCLA § 113(0(1) provides:
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CERCLA as it was originally written."' A private party, contribution
action may follow a voluntary cleanup by one PRP, or may be initi-
ated as a result of an unsuccessful defense against an EPA-driven law-
suit." 2 In the latter situation, the named party may seek contribution
from unnamed PRPs by joining them in the EPA-driven lawsuit
through a third-party action or by seeking to recover from unnamed
PRPs in a subsequent civil action."13
In Superfund cleanup actions, it is widely recognized that, due to
time and money constraints, the EPA does not identify every of-
fender.1 4 Generally, the EPA focuses on financially viable PRPs who
may have contributed a substantial share of the waste. 115 CERCLA's
strict joint and several liability scheme may act as a built-in disincen-
tive for federal investigators to pursue every PRP: from a litigation
standpoint, the government would rather sue one person than one
hundred and, under CERCLA, one financially healthy PRP will do." 6
In practice, however, the EPA usually sues more than one PRP and
those parties left "holding the bag" must sue other PRPs to apportion
their costs to other liable parties. The right of contribution does not
provide a remedy to the severity of CERCLA liability if named PRPs
cannot locate a sufficient number of additional solvent PRPs. Once
suit is brought against another PRP, however, contribution suits are
not difficult to sustain. At least one court has concluded that it is not
necessary for third-party plaintiffs in CERCLA contribution actions
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any
civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this
title. Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this Section and the
Federal Rules of Civil Proceduie and governed by Federal law. In resolving
contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable par-
ties using, such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.
Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an
action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under section 9606 of
this title or section 9607 of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1).
Contribution is not available to a settling defendant regarding the matters ad-
dressed in the settlement, nor is contribution by a non-settling defendant available
against a defendant who settles. "A person who has resolved its liability to the
United States in an administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable
for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(0(2). See Anne D. Weber, Note, Misery Loves Company:-Spreading, the Costs
of CERCLA Cleanup, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1469, 1472-73 (1989).
111. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 724 (2d Cir. 1993) ("In
[CERCLA,] courts are granted implicit authority, using appropriate equitable factors,
to 'allocate response costs among liable parties.' ") (quoting O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d
176, 179 (1st Cir. 1989)).
112. See CERCLA,'42 U.S.C. § 9613(0. See also Weber, supra note 110.
113. 42.U.S.C. § 9613(0.
114. See, e.g., Shore, supra note 34.
115. See Rebecca Walters, Orion Digs for Companies to Cleanup Waste, Bus.
DATELINE, May 24, 1993, § 1, at 7.
116. See Shore, supra note 34.
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to state precisely the types and amounts of hazardous substances sent
to the site.by third-party defendants." 7
CERCLA instructs courts to assess each party's contribution to the
Superfund contamination based on "such equitable factors as the
court determines are appropriate.""18 Factors that have been consid-
ered include: (i) the amount of the hazardous waste involved; (ii) the
degree of the toxicity of the hazardous wastes; (iii) the degree of care
exercised by the parties with respect to the waste; (iv) the degree of
involvement by the parties in the generation, transportation, treat-
ment, storage, or disposal of the hazardous waste; (v) the degree of
cooperation by the parties with government officials to diminish harm
to public health or the environment; (vi) the ability of the parties to
distinguish their contribution to the discharge, release, or disposal of
hazardous waste; (vii) the parties' knowledge or acquiescence in the
contaminating activities; and (viii) the parties' benefits from the con-
taminating activities." 9
United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc.'20 institutionalized a six-point eq-
uitable factors list for contribution cases. Meyer was a minor contri-
bution case involving only $300,000, a mere "pimple on the
elephantine carcass of the CERCLA litigation . . . making its way
through the court system.' 2' One of three defendants appealed the
district court's distribution of liability: one-third each among the gen-
erator-corporation, its principal shareholder, and the appellant prop-
erty owner.' 22 The appellant argued that the term "contribution"
117. United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1270, 1273-75 (D. Del.
1986).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1).
119. Numerous variations on this list are found in the case law. See, e.g., United
States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 932 F.2d 568, 571 (6th Cir. 1991) (instituting the six-factor
fair-share allocation test), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990) [hereinafter Meyer 1];
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Koppers Co., Inc., 771 F. Supp. 1420, 1426 (D. Md. 1991);
Amoco Oil, Co. v. Dingwel, 690 F. Supp. 78, 86 (D. Me. 1988), aff'd sub nom., Travel-
ers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 884 F.2d 629 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. A & F
Materials Co., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984). See also H.R. REP. No. 253,
99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 19 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2385, 3042.
The list 'derives from a proposed amendment to CERCLA expounded by then-
Senator Al Gore in 1985. Daniel M. Abuhoff & Harry Zirlin, Apportionment of Lia-
bility Addressed in CERCLA Bill, N.Y. L.J., June 13, 1994, at S6. The Gore Factors
included the first five factors listed above for determining apportionment. Id. The
legislation proposed by Senator Gore was never enacted. Nevertheless, the proposal
is enjoying strong support under the Clinton Administration. Id.
120. Meyer 1, 932 F.2d 568. See also related cases: United States v. Northernaire
Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1987), aff'd sub nom., United States v.
R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d. 1497 (6th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Meyer II], cert. denied,
494 U.S'. 1057 (1990); United States v. Northemaire Plating Co., No. G84-113CA7,
1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15913 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 18, 1989).
121. Meyer I, 932 F.2d at 573. The total cost of the cleanup plus prejudgment inter-
est was $342,823.22. Id. at 571.
122. The site, an abandoned metal electroplating business in Cadillac, Michigan,
was brought to the attention of authorities when a child received chemical burns from
playing around discarded drums of electroplating waste that were left outside the
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required a technical construction limiting judgment to the percentage
a party's improper conduct caiisally contributed to the toxicity of the
site.12 3 According to the appellant's interpretation, his share would
amount to less than one percent of the total cleanup cost. 1
24
When evaluating the "laundry list" of equitable factors, 25 the Sixth
Circuit observed that appellant bore significant responsibility "simply
by virtue of being the landowner.' 11 6 "Appellant neither assisted nor
cooperated with the EPA officials during their investigation and even-
tial cleanup of the... site. '127 Upholding the lower court's division
of liability, the Court of Appeals emphasized that Congress intended
the courts to approach contribution arrangements "[b]y creative
means, considering all the equities and balancing them in the interests
of justice."' 2 8 This multi-factor method, the court explained, takes
into account more varying circumstances than common-law contribu-
tion, including the "moral contribution" of the parties, the state of
mind of the parties, their economic status, and any contracts and co-
operation between them, resulting in a "modified comparative fault
analysis.' '1 29
The Meyer analysis relied heavily on behavioral and cognitive eval-
uation of the parties' roles in the polluting activities, rather than equi-
table factors involving scientific investigation. The Meyer court's
"creative" evaluation of intangible factors overlooked scientific evi-
dence that is essential to assessing each parties' relative contribution
building. Id. Officials discovered drums and tanks littered outside the facility con-.
taining cyanide and significant amounts of caustic and corrosive materials. Electro-
plating waste had seeped into the ground through the bottom of a catch basin,
entering a pipe that drained into a sewer line that discharged into the sewage treat-
ment plant for the city of Cadillac. Id. at 570 (citing Meyer II, 889 F.2d at 1498-99).
123. Meyer I, 932 F.2d at 572.
124. According to appellant's calculation, its responsibility would be limited to the
cleanup costs incurred as a result of the construction of the sewer line that discharged
wastes into the sewage treatment plant, thus, appellant "generously offer[ed]" to pay
$1709.03. Id.
125. The court considered:
"(1) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to a
discharge release or disposal of a hazardous waste can be distinguished;
"(2) the amount of the hazardous waste involved;
"(3) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved;
"(4) the degree of involvement by the parties in the generation, transporta-
tion, treatment, storage, or disposal of the hazardous waste;
"(5) the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to the hazard-
-ous waste concerned, taking into account the characteristics of such hazard-
ous waste; and
"(6) the degree of cooperation by the parties with Federal, State, or local
officials to prevent any harm to the public health or the environment."
Id. at 571 (quoting Joint App. at 417 (comprising the unpublished opinion of the dis-
trict court)) (quotations in original).'
126. Id.
127. id.
128. Id. at 573.
129. Id. at 572-74.
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'to the environmental damage, such as the toxicity and volume of the
waste, the relative danger presented by the waste, the ability of the
parties to differentiate among the wastes, and the difficulty of remov-
ing the various 'wastes. Although this type of evidence is fundamental
to CERCLA contribution actions, it has been largely disregarded as
"technologically infeasible,"' ° and prohibitively time-consuming or
expensive.' 3
C. Causation
Due to the nature of hazardous wastes and their disposal' proving
c.ause in fact and proximate cause could present enormous hurdles in
CERCLA actions. Superfund sites usually include a variety of haz-
ardous substances that commingle and migrate, making their identifi-
cation difficult, if not impossible, even using state-of-the-art
technology. 132 The myriad wastes are usually generated by many dif-
ferent sources, making PRP identification an arduous task. 33 Fur-
thermore, decades may elapse between the hazardous waste disposal
and the Superfund cleanup, allowing the substances to degenerate. 34
130. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 170 (4th Cir. 1988)
(tracing waste to its source is "technologically infeasible"), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106
(1989); Artesian v. Government of New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1282 (D.
Del. 1987) ("From a technological standpoint, a plaintiff's ability to fingerprint
leachate or other releases has heretofore been exceedingly doubtful."); City of New
York v. Exxon Corp., 766 F. Supp. 177, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("[It is scientifically
impossible to determine the precise origin of any of the hazardous substances that
have been detected at the City landfills." (citing the testimony of the City's Director
of Landfill Engineering, Gleason Aff. 11 5-7)).
131. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 179 n.4 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[C]leanup
efforts [should] not be held hostage to the time-consuming and almost impossible task
of tracing all the waste found at a dump site,"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990);
United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1309 (E.D. Mo. 1987) ("[T]he practical limits
on analytic techniques argue for a weaker causation standard. In particular, the co-
mingling and migration of wastes at a disposal site makes identification of sources
scientifically difficult and economically infeasible."); United States v. South Carolina
Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. SUpp. 984, 990, 993 n.6 (D.S.C. 1984) (noting that
the 7200 55-gallon drums of different hazardous substances stored at the facility
"would'have cost in the range of $2.5 million to attempt through analytical means to
identify all waste types in the conglomerate of materials stored at the [site], approxi-
mately five times the cost of surface removal itself"), modified sub nom., United
States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106
(1989).
132. See, e.g., South Carolina Recycling, 653 F. Supp. at 990, 993 n.6 (7200 55-gallon
drums of different hazardous substances cost nearly $2.5 million to identify all waste
types, almost five times the removal cost); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1286
(D.R.I. 1986) (involving 10,000 barrels and containers).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Co., 990 F.2d 711, 717 (2d Cir.
1993) (83 parties involved with waste disposal center) [hereinafter Alcan 1]; B.F.
Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1196 (2d Cir. 1992) (200 parties connected
with the landfill); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D.
Ohio 1983) (289 generators and trfnsporters connected with the site).
134. E.g., United- States v. Rohin & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1268 (3d Cir. 1993)
(disposal of hazardous waste began in 1917); State of Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 882
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Finally, the extended delay between disposal and injury can niake
practical matters, such as the location of relevant documents or
knowledgeable witnesses, extremely burdensome. 135
These causation hurdles have not impeded the progress of the
EPA's cleanup efforts. The dual impact of sweeping statutory lan-
guage and liberal interpretation give the EPA an edge over its oppo-
nents in CERCLA actions. One pivotal result of this dual effect is
that, when determining whether or not a PRP is liable, the courts do
not construe the statute as requiring causation. 136 The courts do not
require a causal nexus between the defendant's waste and the envi-
ronmental injury.1 37 The courts do not insist that the defendant have
caused the release nor the response CoStS. 138 The defendant itself.
need not have caused anything. The only required nexus is that the
defendant fit one of the PRP roles listed under section 107(a) of CER-
CLA in'relation to a site where response costs have been incurred as a
result of a release. 39 Joint and several liability may be imposed where
no direct fault on the defendant's behalf can be shown. The plain lan-
guage of the statute does not demand proof of causation and, at the
liability stage, the courts have not attempted to analogize CERCLA
liability to traditional tort principles by insisting on a direct causal link
between a. defendant's action and the environmental injury. 140
F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1989) (hazardous waste pollution found at the Blackbird Mine
in Idaho resulted from cobalt and copper mining that began in 1917).
135. See, e.g., Shore, supra note 34, at B5 (reporting the difficult tasks of environ-
mental investigators); Abuhoff & Zirlin, supra note 119, at S6 (reporting on the risk
of unavailability of witnesses'at a later date).
136. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985) ("includ-
ing a causation requirement makes superfluous the affirmative defenses provided in
section 9607(b)"). Accord Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889
F.2d 1146, 1152-54 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 170
(4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989): But see Alcan 1, 990 F.2d at 722
("[W]e candidly admit that causation is being brought back into the case-through
the backdoor.").
137. See, e.g., Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 169 ("CERCLA plaintiffs need not perform
exhaustive chemical analyses of hazardous substances found at a site."); Town of
Munster, Indiana v. Sherwin-Williams, Inc., 27 F.3d 1268, 1273 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[W]e
will not frustrate the statute's salutary goals by engrafting a 'proof of ownership' re-
quirement, which in practice would be as onerous as the language Congress saw fit to
delete.") (citing Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 170); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326,
1333 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("[T]he release ... need only be of 'a' hazardous substance and
not necessarily one contained in the defendant's waste.").
138. See, e.g., United States v. Alcan, 964 F.2d 252, 266 (3d Cir. 1992) [hereinafter
Alcan II]; Alcan 1, 990 F.2d at 721 ("What is not required [under CERCLA] is that
the government show that a specific defendant's waste caused incurrence of clean-up
costs.") (emphasis in original). Accord Dedham, 889 F.2d at 1152-54 (plaintiff need
not establish that the defendant's waste caused or contributed to the response costs).
139. Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1333.
140. E.g., Northwest Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Research Corp., 847 F. Supp.
389, 396 (E.D. Va. 1994) ("Tort causation principles are immaterial to CERCLA lia-
bility."); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., 811 F. Supp. 1421, 1430
(E.D. Cal. 1993) (declaring that CERCLA liability is not based on "traditional tort
notions of causation," rather it is based on "merely a nexus requirement") United
278 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VI
The nearly unbroken line of decisions, holding that proof of a direct
causal link between the defendant's waste and the environmental
damage is not required to establish a defendant's liability, has occa-
sioned vociferous debate in cases in which numerous parties have con-
tributed to the environmental harm. Alcan Aluminum Corporation, a
CERCLA veteran, has waged a decade-long battle against CERCLA
liability, challenging the fundamental logic of the statute.' 41 A three-
time holdout in settlement agreements made between the EPA and
nearly all other defendants in three separate Superfund actions, Al-
can's primary argument in all three cases rested upon the premise that
a defendant who has contributed no more contamination to the envi-
ronment than exists at background levels cannot have caused any in-
jury and, thus, cannot be liable for environmental damage. 142 Alcan
States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1309 (E.D. Mo. 1987) ("[T]raditional tort notions,
such as proximate cause, do not apply."). Courts have applied tort principles at later
stages of litigation. E.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1061 (C.D.
Cal. 1987) (noting that the courts' equitable powers come into play after liability has.
been imposed).
141. City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 744 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.NY. 1991) [hereinaf-
ter Alcan III]; Alcan II, 964 F.2d 252; Alcan I, 990 F.2d 711. Commentary on the
decisions, includes: David M. Moore, The Divisibility of Harm Defense to Joint and
Several Liability Under CERCLA, 23 ENVrL. L. REP. 10,529 (Sept. 1993); David A.
Munro, The Alcan Decisions-CERCLA's Maturing Divisibility Defense, NAT'L
ENV-rL. ENFORCEMENT J., July 1993, at .3; Michael Noone, Note, Environmental
Law-Third Circuit Reexamines Divisibility Under CERCLA-Umted States v. Al-
can Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1992), 66 TEMPLE L. REV. 307 (1993);
Linda L. Rockwood & James L. Harrison, The'Alcan Decisions: Causation Through
the Back Door, 23 ENVrL. L. REP. 10,542 (Sept. 1993); Evan B. Westerfield, Note,
When Less is More: A Significant Risk Threshold for CERCLA Liability, 60 U. CHI;
L. REV. 697 (1993); B. Todd Wetzel, Note, Divisibility of Harm Under CERCLA:
Does an Indivisible Potential or Averted Harm Warrant the Imposition of Joint and
Several Lidbility?, 81 Ky. L.J. 825, 844-46 (1992-93).
142. In Alcan III, Alcan arranged to dispose of 3.9 million gallons of its waste emul-
sion between 1978 and 1980 through a waste disposal company, the owner of which
was later convicted of bribing a city official to accept illegal hazardous waste at city
landfills located in the boroughs of New York City. Alcan III, 744 F. Supp. at 477-78
n.5. Approximately 30 truckloads of Alcan's waste amounting to approximately
200,000 gallons were disposed of in city landfills. Id. at 481. Alcan, one of 15 defend-
ants and one of two thatdid not settle, defended against the city's suit with a "com-
mon sense" argument that, inter alia, the trace amounts of regulated substances did
not bring its wastes within the meaning of hazardous substances under CERCLA. Id.
at 476, 484. Alcan's "proof" of its hypothesis was that the substances found in its'
emulsion occurred naturally in the environment in concentrations greater than the
concentrations in Alcan's waste. Id. at 484. Indeed, Alcan argued that the level of
"hazardous" substances found in Alcan's emulsion was no greater than that found in
the actual paper used in the legal brief filed with the court by the government in the
case. The court did not agree that "holding a company liable for disposing of certain
substances in its waste in concentrations which are assertedly less than those which
occur naturally ... defies common sense" because numerous defendants might avoid
liability while "the plaintiff is left with the substantial cleanup costs associated with
the defendants' accumulated wastes." Id. at 484-85.
In Alcan II, several liquid waste transport companies poured millions of gallons of
liquid hazardous waste into a borehole that connected to a network of approximately
five square miles of deep underground mines, caverns, and waterways during the
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challenged a definition of hazardous waste that encompassed below-
ambient levels of naturally occurring substances. 143 Taken to its logi-
cal conclusion, such a definition means that, under CERCLA, sub-
stances need not be hazardous or even harmful to trigger liability. 44
Moreover, imposing joint and several liability in such circumstances
offends traditional notions of justice and contradicts CERCLA's man-
date-to protect human health and the environment-because, it im-
poses liability for the release of substances that pose no real threat.14 5
Despite obvious flaws in CERCLA's liability scheme, the courts de-
clined to vindicate Alcan. 46 Alcan's litigation trilogy reveals the
weakness in CERCLA's liability scheme and the strength of the EPA
in achieving the statute's overriding goals.
D. A Way Out: Apportionment
As CERCLA case law has developed, courts have struggled to ra-
tionalize the unfair results when CERCLA's harsh liability provisions
dictate the imposition of astronomical cleanup expenses where no
.1970s. Alcan 11, 964 F.2d at 256. In 1985, 100,000 gallons of contaminated liquid,
including roughly 35,000 gallons of Alcan's waste emulsion, a relatively benign mix of
mineral oil and trace metals, were released from the tunnels into the Susquehanna
River in Pennsylvania. Id. at 256. Alcan contended that because its waste emulsion
contained fewer hazardous elements than that found in "clean" dirt, it could not have
caused any environmental harm. Id. at 259. The court's expansive definition, Alcan
asserted, would effectively render everything in the universe hazardous, extending
CERCLA's reach far beyond what Congress intended. Id. at 259. The court coun-.
tered that the release alone must be shown to justify response costs, not the particular
waste generated by the defendant. Id. at 264. The court stated that to permit a gener-
ator to escape liability when its individual harm was minimal, though it was significant
when added to other generators' waste, would be contrary to environmental policy.
Id.
In Alcan I, a CERCLA cost-recovery action brought by the United States and New
York State against 83 defendants for hazardous waste releases at a disposal and treat-
ment center in Oswego County, New York, Alcan was the lone holdout. Alcan 1, 990
F.2d at 717. Facing a cleanup bill of more than $5 million, Alcan argued that, inter
alia, its 4.6 million gallons of oil emulsion did not fall under -the definition of "hazard-
ous substances" under CERCLA. Id. at 71718. Alcan asserted that the district
court's interpretation of hazardous waste would effectively render "breakfast cereal,
the soil, and nearly everything else upon which life depends" a hazardous substance.
Id. at 716. The court spurned Alcan's "fears that 'the butcher, the baker and the
candlestick maker'" would become PRPs as alarmist. Id. While rejecting Alcan's
worn-out defenses, the court allowed causation "[to enter] through the backdoor," at
the apportionment stage, at which time Alcan might show a reasonable basis upon
which to apportion liability. Id. at 721-22. Significantly, the court added, "Based on
... common law principles, Alcan may escape any liability for response costs if it
either succeeds in proving that its oil emulsion, when mixed with other hazardous
wastes, did not contribute to the release and the cleanup costs that followed, or con-
tributed at most to only a divisible portion of the harm." Id. (citing Alcan II, 964 F.2d
at 270).
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manifest nexus exists between the defendant's waste and the damage.
To inject a dose of fairness into CERCLA's merciless liability scheme,
the courts have introduced common-law tort principles as a guide at
the apportionment stage of Superfund cleanup actions.147 Once a de-
fendant's liability has been established, courts may consider "any cri-
teria relevant to determining whether there should be an
apportionment.' ' 48 Courts are authorized to "allocate response costs
among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court deter-
mines are appropriate," thereby affording considerable "discretion to
use equitable factors in apportioning damages in order to mitigate the
hardships of imposing joint and several liability upon defendants who
have only contributed a small amount to a potentially large indivisible
harm.' 149 Based -on the evidence submitted by responsible parties
who face joint and several liability for the cleanup,, the court deter-
mines whether a reasonable basis for apportionment exists.'50 If a de-
fendant succeeds in showing its harm is divisible, it may limit its
liability to that portion of the harm fairly attributable to it or avoid
liability altogether.' 15  Otherwise, cleanup costs will rest entirely on
the shoulders of the unsuccessful defendant. 152
147. Alcan 1, 990 F.2d at 721-22 ("To avoid such a harsh result courts have added a
common law gloss [of the Restatement of Torts] onto the statutory framework.");
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (relying
on the Restatement of Torts to determine defendant's contribution to the harm).
Section 433A of the Second Restatement of Torts provides:
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes
where (a) there are distinct harms, or (b) there is a reasonable basis for
determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm. (2) Damages
for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or more causes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965).
Section 881 of the Second Restatement of Torts sets forth the affirmative defense
based upon the divisibility of harm rule in section 433A:
If two or more persons, acting independently, tortiously cause distinct harms
or a single harm for which there is a reasonable basis for division according
to the contribution of each, each is subject to liability only for the portion of
the total harm that he has himself caused.
Id. § 881.
Section 875 of the Restatement places the burden of proof on the wrongdoer:
Each of two or more persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a
single and indivisible harm to the injured party is subject to liability to the
injured party for the entire harm.
Id. § 875.
148. H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3,. at 18-19 (1985), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 3041-42.
149. United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
150. United States v. Marisol, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 833, 843 (M.D. Pa. 1989).
151. United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1-265, 1280 (3d Cir. 1993).
152. O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 182 (1st Cir. 1989) (approving imposition of
joint and several liability after court determined that harm was indivisible), cert. de-
nied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990). Accord United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 166
(4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
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The "divisibility rule" was first promulgated in United States v.
Chem-Dyne Corp.,"' the first published opinion to examine the legis-
lative history of CERCLA on the issue of joint and several liability.
The Chem-Dyne court concluded that Congress intended the scope of
liability to be determined under common-law principles on a case-by-
case basis. 154 Relying on the Second Restatement of Torts, the court
-endorsed joint and several liability in the absence of proof that a de-
fendant's harm is divisible.' 55 After reviewing the evidence, the court
found that the defendants were unable to carry their burden of proof
because the origins of the 608,000 pounds of commingled hazardous
material that were deposited at the site by nearly 300 generators and
transporters could not be ascertained. 56 Moreover, the court found
that the migratory potential of each waste in the soil and groundwater
and the concomitant health risks could not be accurately predicted.157
Thus, the court held that the sheer number of wastes and parties in-
volved in the disposal left unresolved factual issues that made divisi-
bility impossible.158 In subsequent CERCLA litigation, the Chem-
Dyne divisibility rule was routinely employed by other circuits and
eventually affirmed by Congress with the enactment of SARA. 59
In United States v. Monsanto Co.,16° the government sued to recover
response costs for the cleanup of hazardous substances leaking into
the ground from decaying drums belonging to various PRPs.16  The
concoction of waste materials had produced noxious fumes, fires, and
explosions.' 62 The defendants appealed the district court's imposition
of joint and several liability, contending that the admittedly "single
153. 572 F. Supp. 802, 809-11 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
154. Id. at 808. The court stated:
[R]eading of the entire legislative history in context reveals that' the scope of
liability and term joint and several liability were deleted to avoid a
mandatory legislative standard applicable in all situations which might pro-
duce inequitable results in some cases. The deletion was not intended as a
rejection of joint and several liability. Rather, the term was omitted in order
to have the scope of liability determined under common law principles,
where a court performing a case by case evaluation of the complex factual
scenarios associated with multiple-generator waste sites will assess the pro-
priety of applying joint and several liability on an individual basis.
Id.




159. See H.R. REP. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 54 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2836. The House commented that it "fully subscribes to the rea-
soning of the court in the seminal case of United States v. Chem-Dyne Corporation,
572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983), which established a uniform federal rule allowing
for joint and several liability in appropriate CERCLA cases." Id. at 74, reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2856.
160. 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 164.
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harm" was divisible based on the volume of waste sent to the site by
each defendant. 16 3 Following in Chem-Dyne's footsteps, the Fourth
Circuit rejected the volumetric approach as a reasonable basis on
which to apportion liability when the hazardous substances have thor-
oughly commingled, reasoning that "[c]ommon sense counsels that a
million gallons of certain substances could be mixed together without
significant consequences, whereas a few pints of others improperly
mixed could result in disastrous consequences.' 1 64 A volumetric ap-
proach, the court noted, fails to account for the relative toxicity or
migratory capacity of each hazardous substance that varies indepen-
dently of the volume of the waste. 165 The court observed that Con-
gress, in its final version of CERCLA, specifically obviated the
requirement of proof that a particular defendant's waste caused or
contributed to the environmental injury to avoid the difficulties plain-
tiffs would confront in the multi-generator context if required to prove
such a connection. The court stated, "[I]n deleting causation language
from Section 107(a), we assume as have many other courts, that Con-
gress knew of the synergistic and migratory capacities of leaking
chemical waste, and the technological infeasibility of tracing improp-
erly disposed waste to its source."'1 66
163. Id. at 171.
164: Id. at 172. The EPA found substances "in every hazardous class,' including
explosives, such as crystallized dynamite and nitro-glycerine... oxidizers, flammable
and non-flammable, liquids, poisons, corrosives, containered gas and even a small
amount of radioactive material." Id. at 172 n.25. Significantly, the Monsanto court
observed, "Under the circumstances, volumetric apportionment based on the overall
quantity of waste, as opposed to quantity and quality of the hazardous substances
would have made little sense." Id.
The Monsanto court rejected the volumetric approach under the circumstances of
the case, but remarked in a footnote that "[v]olumetric contribution provides a rea-
sonable basis for apportioning liability only if it can be reasonably assumed, or it has
been demonstrated, that independent factors had no substantial effect on the harm to
the environment." Id. at 172 n.27. Accord In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d
889, 900 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding the volumetric approach'reasonable when contamina-
tion involved only one hazardous substance and no synergistic effects).
In most cases, volume is only one of a melange of elements involved in an alloca-
tion formula. See, e.g., Meyer I, 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057
(1990); Amoco Oil Co. v. Dingwell, 690 F. Supp. 78, 86 (D. Me. 1988), aff'd, 884 F.2d
629 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256
(S.D. Ill. 1984).
165. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172-73.
166. Id. at 170. Accord United States v. Ottati, 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985).
Ottati was a cost recovery action against operators and former operators of drum
reconditioning businesses, property owners, and generators of waste contained in the
drums that were sent to the site for reconditioning. Although the generators submit-
ted evidence of the approximate number of drums each defendant brought to the site,
the court nevertheless imposed joint and several liability because "the exact amount
or quantity of deleterious chemicals or other noxious matter [could not] be pin-
pointed as to each defendant [and] [tihe resulting proportionate harm to surface and
groundwater [could not] be proportioned with any degree of accuracy as to any indi-
vidual defendant." Id. at 1396.
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The First Circuit echoed the Fourth Circuit's adoption of the Chem-
Dyne analysis in O'Neil v. Picillo,167 in which the contaminated site, a
Rhode Island pig farm, encompassed massive trenches and pits " 'fil-
led, with free-flowing, multi-colored, pungent liquid wastes' and
thousands of 'dented and corroded drums containing a.veritable pot-
pourri of toxic fluids.' 168 Appellants supported their assertion of di-
visibility with evidence of the total number- of barrels excavated
during each phase of the cleanup, the number of barrels in each phase
attributable to them, and the cost of each phase.169 However, testi-
mony that only 300 to 400 of the 10,000 barrels excavated could be
attributed to any of the defendants compelled the court to uphold
joint and several liability. 17° The court reasoned that even if the
number of barrels attributable to each defendant could be deter-
mined, more evidence would be required to demonstrate that the re-
moval costs were capable of apportionment because the cost of
removing barrels would vary depending upon their contents. 17 Any
attempt to apportion the costs of removing soil in which "wastes of
varying (and unknown) degrees of toxicity and migratory potential
[had] commingle[d] . . . would necessarily be arbitrary.' 1 72 In such
situations, the court observed, "defendants [pay] for more than their
share of the harm," but, "where all of the contributing causes cannot
fairly be traced, Congress intended for those proven at least partially
culpable to bear the cost of the uncertainty. 173 After reviewing evi-
dence presented to the district court, the First Circuit held that the
appellants failed to satisfy "the stringent burden placed on them by
Congress,"' 74 noting that the practical effect of this burden is that re-
sponsible parties rarely escape joint and several liability. 75
The O'Neil decision highlights the irony of the judiciary's dilemma
in satisfying CERCLA's liability scheme. In an effort to decrease
CERCLA's unfair results, the courts have carved out a wide playing
field to exercise their own discretion over how liability is imposed.
However, the courts' equitable powers have proven largely ineffective
because of the practical impediments to proving divisibility. This fail-
ure, in turn, results in the unfair outcomes in CERCLA litigation that
the courts were attempting to alleviate.
The O'Neil court underscores the defendants' predicament. At-
tempts to implement the divisibility rule usually fail because reason-
167. 883 F.2d 176 (lst Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990).
168. Id at 177 (quoting the lower court's decision in O'Neil, 682 F. Supp. 706, 709,
725 (D.R.I. 1988)).
169. Id. at 181.
170. Id. at 182.
171. Id
172. Id. at 178-79, 183 n.11.
173. Id. at 179.
174. Id. at 183.
175. l d at 178-79.
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able allocation is a technological impossibility in multi-source cases.' 76
In multi-source, multi-substance cases, the unknown character of
chemical substances makes it technologically infeasible to elevate ap-
portionment above "mere speculation.' 1 77 Thus, as a practical matter,
defendants rarely escape joint and several liability.' 78 Whether or not
defendants succeed in diminishing their liability, they frequently pay
more than their fair share.179 The courts' increased equitable powers
have failed to afford defendants any relief from CERCLA's radical
liability results.
The first case in which an appellate court ruled that the district
court erred in applying joint and several liability because the defend-
ant had, as a matter of law, successfully proved its harm was divisible
was In re Bell Petroleum Services,180 a Superfund cost recovery action
that neither involved multiple sources nor multiple substances.' 81 The
Fifth Circuit's thorough perusal of CERCLA case law revealed three
approaches to the application of joint and several liability: (1) the
176. Id. at 179.
177. In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 894 (5th Cir. 1993).
178. O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 178-79.
179. Id. at 179. Alcan H provides another example. The lower court held Alcan
liable for more than seven times its share, $473,790.18 out of a total of $1,302,290.18,
harnessing Alcan, five percent of the defendant pool, with over 36% of the costs.
Alcan II, 964 F.2d at 270. The appellate court took the novel step of remanding the
case for a hearing on divisibility, noting that Alcan might escape joint and several
liability if it proved that its waste did not or could not, when mixed with other hazard-
ous waste,.contribute to the release and the resultant response costs. Id. at 270. How-
ever,, the court expressed doubt about Alcan's chances of overcoming its' heavy
burden of proof on remand, as a practical matter, due to the factually complex "as-
sessment of the relative toxicity, migratory potential and synergistic capacity of the
hazardous waste at issue." Id. at 269. See also United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp.,
720 F. Supp. 1027 (D. Mass. 1989) (two dozen non-settling parties sued for cleanup
costs averaging nine times their proportionate volumetric shares), aff'd, 899 F.2d 79
(1st Cir. 1990); Advance Circuits, Inc. v. Carriere Properties, No. C8-87-1436, 1988
Minn. App. LEXIS 118 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1988) (holding the owners and opera-
tors of two recycling facilities liable for 70% of the response costs incurred by 13
generators in cleaning up the sites).
180. 3 F.3d 889 (5th Cir. 1993). -
181. Id. In Bell Petroleum, waste from a chrome-plating shop operated by the three
defendants in succession from 1971 through .1977 had contaminated the local water
supply of Odessa, Texas. Id. at 892. The EPA sought to recover the direct and indi-
rect costs of studying, designing, and constructing the alternate water supply system.
Id. at 893. The lower court held that the evidence demonstrated that no method of
dividing the liability among the defendants would rise to any level "above mere spec-
ulation." Id. at 894. Each of the proposed apportionment methods differed signifi-
cantly and involved a conspicuous assumption factor because records had been lost.
In the alternative, the lower court apportioned responsibility based on equitable fac-
tors: Bell-35%; Sequa-35%; and Leigh-30%. Id.
In a typical CERCLA case, it is extremely rare to have a site that is contaminated
by only one substance and to have three responsible parties who owned or operated
the site at mutually exclusive times. Given the unique factual makeup of Bell Petro-
leum, the appellate court's holding that defendants successfully carried their burden
of proof of divisibility does not portend major transformations in the outcome of
CERCLA litigation.
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Chem-Dyne method, (2) the Alcan method, and (3) the "moderate"
approach.18  The Chem-Dyne divisibility rule, which relies heavily on
the Restatement of Torts, allows a defendant to escape joint and sev-
eral liability if it can prove the extent of its harm to the total injury.'83
Under the Alcan method, a. variation of the Chem-Dyne rule, a de-
fendant "may escape liability altogether if it can prove that its waste,
even when mixed with other wastes at the site, did not cause the incur-
rence of response costs."'" Finally, the moderate approach combines
tort principles to determine whether a reasonable basis for apportion-
ment exists with the equitable factors typically invoked in contribution
cases. 185 The Bell Petroleum court opted to follow the majority Chem-
Dyne rule, emphasizing that the equitable factors that are properly
employed in contribution cases are not appropriate in cost recovery
actions. 86
The Bell Petroleum court' analysis summarizes the current interpre-
tation of CERCLA's regulatory scheme. First, joint and several liabil-
ity is not mandated under CERCLA.'87 Congress intended that the
federal courts impose joint and several liability only in appropriate
cases according to common-law principles. 18  Once liability has been
imposed, opinions diverge about the proper timing of the resolution of
the divisibility question and about whether equitable factors may be
appropriately considered. 8 9 In the interest of judicial economy, some
courts apply equitable factors during the cost recovery action, while
other courts avoid any contribution-style assessment until the respon-
sible parties bring a contribution action against other PRPs.190 Courts
also disagree about whether a defendant can avoid liability for all, or
only some portion, of the damages. 191 Finally, when wastes of un-
known toxicity, migratory potential, and synergistic effect have com-
182. Id at 901. The "moderate approach" is discussed supra at note 102 and in the
discussion in part II.D.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 153-59.
184. Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 901.
185. See id. at 899-900. See also supra text accompanying notes 120-29. -186. 3 F.3d at 902. The Bell Petroleum court drew on its decision in another CER-'
CLA cost-recovery action to sustain its holding that "in cases involving multiple
sources of contamination, a plaintiff need not prove a specific causal link between
costs incurred and an individual generator's waste." Id. at 893 n.4 (citing Amoco Oil
Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 670 n.8. (5th Cir. 1989)).
187. Id. at 895.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 901. Compare United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 n.22(4th Cir. 1988) ("[E]quitable factors are relevant in subsequent actions for contribu-
tion. They are not pertinent to the question of joint and several liability, which focuses
principally on the divisibility among responsible parties' of the harm to the environ-
ment."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989), with United States v. A & F Materials Co.,
578 F. Supp. 1249, 1257 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (invoking the six-factor equitable list in a cost-
recovery action to promote fairness by allowing courts to be sensitive to the inherent
unfairness of imposing joint and several liability on minor contributors).
190. See Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 898-99.
191. Id. at 901.
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mingled, defendants are allowed an opportunity to attempt to prove
that there is a reasonable basis for apportionment, "although they
rarely succeed."' 9
The dissension among the courts revolves around the absence of
data demonstrating a direct nexus between the defendant and the
waste, and the inability to measure degrees of harm with quantifiable
evidence. The essential flaw in Superfund litigation, which universally
involves chemical substances, is the inability to ground a determina-
tion of liability in a concrete appraisal of environmental harm.
III. CHEMICAL FINGERPRINTING: ITS ORIGINS, LIMITATIONS,
AND ADVANCES
Chemical fingerprinting is among the fastest-growing areas of scien-
tific analysis. It has been used for a multitude of purposes outside the
legal realm, from geochemical surveying 93 to pinpointing the origin of
atmospheric methane releases. 94 In the legal arena, chemical finger-
printing has been recognized in diverse disciplines including patent
law' 95 and well monitoring."9 An entire cottage industry has cropped
up in the field of fingerprinting techniques 97 and chemical coding to
prevent counterfeiting. 1 8 Many upstart companies tout themselves as
192. Id.
193. Conventional fingerprinting methods are used by oil companies in geochemi-
cal exploration to assess the economic potential of oil drilling sites. D.A. Flory et al.,
Sophisticated Equipment Fingerprints Crude Oils, OIL & GAS J., Feb. 20, 1978, at 102.
Oil is formed from a variety of organic materials, chemically converted over long
periods. Id. The variable quality of naturally occurring oil results in distinct chemical
differences between oils formed under different conditions. Id. These differences de-
fine the oil's family. Id. "Oil families" are groups of crude oils having similar molecu-jar, isotopic, and other characteristics that derive from the same organic source facies
in a stratigraphic sequence. Id. The fingerprint of a particular oil family tells explor-
ers how much oil is located at the site and how easily accessible it is based on the oil
family's migration pattern. Id
194. New Zealand Study Links Atmospheric Methane Drop with Changes in USSR,
Global Warming Network Online Today, Feb. 16, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Cumws File.
195. In re Fisher, 307 F.2d 948 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (chemical fingerprint used to iden-
tify an invention).
196. E.g., Richard Winton, City Says Tainted Spring Is Not Linked to Landfill, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 15, 1993, at J3. See also Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc.,
689 F. Supp. 1223, 1230 (D. Mass. 1988) (applying fingerprinting techniques to trace
the source of groundwater contamination), vacated on other grounds, 889 F.2d 1146(1st Cir. 1989).
197. See, e.g., Superfund Parties Could Make Use of 'Fingerprinting' to Set Liability,
AIR WATER POLLUTION REP., Jan. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, Envirn Library,
Allnws File [hereinafter Superfund Parties]; Transport Canada Releases Response to
1990 Brander-Smith Report, OIL SPILL INTELLIGENCE REP., Sept. 9, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Envirn Library, Allnws File. ,
198. Gulam Samdani, ed., Covert Labeling Helps Catch Polluters and Counterfeit-
ers, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEws, July 1994, at 27, 27, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Cumws File (discussing the advantages of bulk-product fingerprinting prior
to sale to avoid loss of revenues due to counterfeiting).
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"environmental investigators"-specialists in reconstructing the his-
tory of hazardous waste sites to ascertain the cause and extent of the
damage.199
"Chemical fingerprinting" refers to the identification of unique
properties intrinsic to a chemical substance by a combination of ana-
lytic techniques.?" The term "fingerprint," often used interchangea-
bly with the term "signature,"20  has also been used to refer to
petrochemical characteristics expressed in graphs,20 z underground
chemical migration patterns called plumes, and the "tracers" -left be-
hind in the plumes.20 3
Conventional fingerprinting methods rely on two processes: liquid
chromatography20  and simple spectrophotometry.2 °  Liquid chroma-
tography separates the components of a chemical sample by funneling
the sample solution through an absorbent material.20 6 Spectropho-
tometry examines the absorption of light passing through a chemical
sample; because different chemicals absorb light at different frequen-
cies, the missing light frequencies indicate which che~iicals are present
in the sample.20 7 While the conventional methods of chemical finger-
printing can reveal the types of chemicals present in a given sample,
their "low-resolution" print is inadequate to establish the uniqueness
of a particular chemical's source.20 8 When the release is small or
many pollutants have been added to the offensive chemical soup, con-
199. See, e.g., Dick Dahl, A New Weapon in Environmental Cases: 'Chemical Fin-
gerprinting' Traces an Oil Spill's Origins, LAW. WEEKLY (USA), June 21, 1993, at B3;
Shore, supra note 34, at B5; Rosenfeld, supra note 28, at 9; Walters, supra note 115, at
7.
200. For a discussion of emerging fingerprinting techniques, see Robert Bogue, Re-
cent Advances in Environmental Sensing, CONTROL & INSTRUMENTATION, June 1992,
at 35, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
201. See, e.g., Andrew Blum & Janet Raloff, Regulation & the Environment,
PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS, Aug. 2, 1993, at 3, available in LEXIS, Envirn Library,
AIlnws File.
202. The complex pattern of graphs representing the components of a particular
type of oil is analogous to the complex pattern found in human fingerprints. Larry H.
Gibson, Oil Identification Strategies Used to Track Spill Sources, OFFSHORE, Apr.
1991, at 40, available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Allnws File.
203. For example, the source of groundwater contamination can be 'fingerprinted"
by identifying the pattern and ratio of chemical constituents that consistently appear
in groundwater monitoring wells within the plume. -Dedham Water Co. v. Cumber-
land Farms, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 1223, 1230 (D. Mass. 1988), vacated on other grounds,
889 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 1989). Plumes from various sources can be distinguished by
the use of chemical tracers. Id. Tracers are chemicals consistently used and dis-
charged in significant quantities by a particular source. Id.
204. Chromatographic techniques deal with the separation of components in a mix-
ture and subsequent detection of those separated components. Fingering Pollution,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 27, 1993, at 91.
.205. Spectroscopic techniques deal with the interaction of samples with light. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Comes of Age, supra note 8.
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ventional methods cannot provide definitive information.0 9 Conven-
tional methods yield "smudged" fingerprints when the contamination
has been altered by natural degradation over time.21 0 At the typical
Superfund site, which is plagued by all of these problems (multiple
pollutants, multiple sources, and deterioration over time), conven:
tional fingerprinting techniques are only partially successful at identi-
fying the pollutants and wholly unsuccessful at identifying the
pollution source.21'
Modern fingerprinting techniques overcome conventional limita-
tions on many levels. Not only do they afford magnified sensitivity to
chemical constituents, they are also more varied, incorporating emerg-
ing technologies into the fingerprinting processes when necessary to
supplement initial findings..' 2 Advanced Chemical Fingerprinting
("ACF") uses refined analytic techniques to identify the trace sub-
stances that accompany a chemical's main components. 1 3 ACF
methods, such as gas chromatography ("GC") 14 and mass spectro-
209. Id.; Abuhoff & Zirlin, supra note 119, at S6.
210. Comes of Age, supra note 8.
211. Id
212. For example, evolving technologies . based on computer-generated models il-
lustrate the movement of hazardous substances through the soil and groundwater.
Abuhoff & Zirlin, supra note 119, at S6. See generally Arthur D. Little Corp., SETAC
Platform Session Abstracts: Advanced Chemical Fingerprinting (Nov. 15, 1993) (on
file with the Fordham Environmental Law Journal) [hereinafter SETAC Platform Ses-
sion Abstracts].
213. Fingering Pollution, supra note 204.
214. Gas chromatographic ("GC") analysis is described as follows:
, In gas chromatographic analysis, [a] sample is vaporized and passed
through a capillary-fused silica chromatographic column using helium as a
carrier gas. [Vaporization creates a more pronounced breakdown than con-
ventional liquid techniques.] The components of the sample are separated
basically in order of their boiling point. The separation results from parti-
tioning of molecular species between a stationary phase coated on the inside
of the column and the helium mobile phase.
As the separated components leave the column, their relative concentra-
tions are measured using a flame ionization detector. The chromatogram or
fingerprint produced is a plot of the relative concentration of the compo-
nents versus their retention'time, the amount of time required for the com-.
ponent to travel through the column.
Gibson, supra note 202, at S6.
High performance liquid, chromatography ("HPLC"), another separation tech-
nique, is based on the polarity of the components in the sample, and is described as
follows:
As implied by the name, the sample remains in liquid form and the separa-
tion occurs in a packed chromatographic column.
Like gas chromatography, .the components of the sample are partitioned
between a mobile and a stationary phase to effect the separation. The sol-
vent used for the mobile phase is acetonitrile, while the stationary phase is
coated on the column packing. When the components leave the column,
they pass through two detectors.
The first detector measures the amount of ultraviolet light of a single wave
length absorbed by the components. The second detector measures the
amount of light energy fluoresced by the components. These values are plot-
CHEMICAL FINGERPRINTING
photometry ("MS"),2 15 are 100 times more sensitive than conventional
fingerprinting. techniques. 216 GC can detect trace pollutants in quanti-
ties of less than one part per million; MS detects one part in a tril-
lion.2 17 The heightened sensitivity of ACF yields greater detail about
individual chemicals when numerous pollutants contaminate a single
site and recognizes chemical fingerprints even when they are weath-
ered or biodegraded with time.21N The specific source of the substance
is identified by fragmenting the chemical into its basic elements and
extracting unique markers, such as a specific dye, paint, or gasoline.219
The distinct chemical composition, including the markers, is compared
to the 'fingerprints of possible sources, such as nearby manufacturing
plants or polluters known to have dumped in the area, by a sophisti-
cated form of pattern recognition much like matching human
fingerprints.22 °
ted versus the retention time of the components in the column to produce a
chromatogram for comparison with other samples.
Id.
215. Fluorescence spectroscopy technique is described as follows:
Fluorescence spectroscopy uses ultraviolet light in the analysis of samples.
Some compounds, especially petroleum aromatics, have the ability to absorb
ultraviolet light increasing the energy level of their electrons., When the
electrons return to their stable state, the energy is emitted as light of a longer
wavelength.
This process, which occurs almost instantaneously, is known as fluores-
cence. For oil fingerprinting, a very dilute solution of oil in solvent is ex-
posed to light energy scanned over the ultraviolet spectrum. The amount of
light fluoresced by the compounds in the sample is measured and plotted
versus the wavelength of that emitted light to give a fluorescence fingerprint.
Id.
Infrared spectroscopy is described as follows:
Infrared spectroscopy also uses absorption of light energy to provide in-
formation about... samples. Molecules can absorb infrared light at specific
frequencies to increase the vibrational energy of the chemical bonds within
the molecules. For infrared spectroscopy, the amount of light absorbed by a
sample is measured and plotted against the frequency of the absorbed light
to form a fingerprint.
Id.
216. Fingering'Pollution, supra note 204.
217. Id.
218. See Superfund Parties, supra note 197; 'Supersleuthing' Technique Spotlights
Chemical Polluters; Called into Play as Industries Face Millions of Dollars in Environ-
mental Damages, PR Newswire, Dec. 2, 1993.
219. Superfund Parties, supra note 197; Abuhoff & Zirlin, supra note 119, at S6.
Markers are substances deliberately added to a product that enable a company to
distinguish its product from a competitor's. Abuhoff & Zirlin, supra note 119, at S6.
Although the marker was originally meant to support patentability or to protect trade
secrets, the marker is now used to determine which waste belongs to each PRP. Id.
220. Pattern recognition refers to the comparison of the particular chemical's fin-
gerprint to a library of previously registered fingerprints of the same kind of chemical
or sample fingerprints from the potential sources of the spill. Gibson, supra note 202.
Patent and trademark registrations also provide information about the distinct
makeup of chemicals. See In re Fisher, 307 F.2d 948 (C.C.P.A. 1962). See also Comes
of Age, supra note 8.
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The vast variety of ACF techniques and the specificity with which
each is tailored to a particular chemical makes ACF superior to con-
ventional techniques. However, with error margins of plus or minus
ten percent, ACF is not foolproof.22 For example, oil samples taken
from Suisin Bay, California, when fingerprinted using High Perform-
ance Liquid Chromatography ("HPLC"), GC, and MS, were found to
be indistinguishable. By applying a second ACF technique to the
test results, that is, fingerprinting the fingerprints themselves using a
double ratio plot comparison of selected polynuclear aromatic hydro-
carbon alkyl homologues, different oils were discerned among the
samples.223 A similar procedure is used to overcome the "cloudy" im-
prints made by weathered chemical fingerprints.224
At a majority of Superfund sites, the hazardous waste mess has
been exacerbated by the variety and number of different wastes
dumped by a myriad of parties over a long period of time.22 ACF is
designed to defeat such obstacles and, as its utility gains recognition,
exploitation of ACF techniques becomes customary in the chemical
industry.226 Notwithstanding ACF's growth in popularity, its entry
into the court system has been slow. Because environmental regula-
tions were in place before such sophisticated scientific analysis was
possible, the standards of proof do not require the kind of precision
ACF can provide and the utility of ACF is not widely recognized in
CERCLA cases. In terms of evidentiary standards, the courts remain
conspicuously, behind technology.
221. Superfund Parties, supra note 197.
"We've done some studies where we've been able to say, 'Plant A is respon-
sible for 30 percent of the contamination, Plant B for 70 percent,' and been
able to back it up with data," he said. "Even then, there is a certain uncer-
tainty, because it could be 70 percent plus or minus 10 percent."
Id. (quotations in original) (quoting Paul Boehm, managing director of earth and
*marine sciences at Arthur D. Little consulting company and one of the principal ar-
chitects of ACF techniques). The article continued to state, "The technology will
never yield results that are 100% accurate, but margins of error will be smaller as the
technique is advanced. . . ." Id. (referring to Boehm's statement).
222. John S. Brown et al., Arthur D. Little, Inc., The Usq Polynuclear Aromatic
Hydrocarbon (PAH) Alkyl Homologues in Determining Petroleum Source Identifica-
tion and Weathering (Nov. 15, 1993) (abstract of an invited paper) in SETAC Plat-
form Session Abstracts, supra note 212.
223. Id.
224. Id For example, a double ratio plot of alkyl chrysenes and alkyl dibenzothi-
ophenes distinguishes the fingerprints of weathered oil samples because dibenzothi-
ophenes degrade more rapidly than chrysenes. Id.
225. See, e.g., Alcan III, 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha,
958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992); O'Neil v Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.
1985); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283 (D.R.I. 1986); United States v. Chem-Dyne
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Price 1, 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983).
1 226. See Dahl, supra note 199, at B3 (giving examples of unsuccessful ACF applica-
tion in recent Massachusetts cases); Boehm, supra note 8, at 4 (giving examples of
ACF as a tool for both defense and prosecution).
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In 1974, in United States v. Ashland Oil & Transportation Co.,227 an
appeal upholding a guilty verdict and a $500 fine against the owner of
a pipeline who did not "immediately" notify the EPA of a spill of 3200
gallons of crude oil into a non-navigable stream,228 the Sixth Circuit
declared, "Drops (or barrels) of oil carry no fingerprints. 229 The
court went on to say that "water analysis, which might show oil pollu-
tion, could not possibly prove which polluter discharged it, in what
proportion, or on what occasion. '230 In contrast, 1992 samples of oil
deposits and tarballs collected from the shores along the Southern
coast of Louisiana that were analyzed with ACF revealed thirty-six
different fingerprints attributable to at least eight sources.231 Thus,
chemical analysis techniques that were once inconceivable have ad-
vanced dramatically while the approach to environmental pollution
litigation has remained stagnant. As discussed above, CERCLA's
regulatory scheme reflects that antiquated approach.
IV. ADVANCED CHEMICAL FINGERPRINTING: A CERCLA
LITIGANT's AIDE-DE-CAMP
ACF has the potential to revolutionize Superfupd litigation by re-
suscitating CERCLA's obsolete liability program. ACF raises eviden-
tiary standards beyond mere presumption and imparts a modicum of
fairness into the adjudicative -process. Notwithstanding the courts'
recognition that defendants seldom overcome their burden of proof
when the commingling factor is present, at least one court has de-
clared that "'commingled' waste is not synonymous with 'indivisible'
harm, 2 32 leaving the door open for defendants to use ACF to defeat
the presumption of indivisibility that accompanies multi-source
superfund site litigation.
227. 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974) [hereinafter Ashland 1].
228. Id. at 1319 (finding that notification to the EPA 15 hours after the oil spill
occurred was not immediate within the meaning of the statute). See also United
States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 364 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Ky. 1973) [hereinafter
Ashland If], aff'd, Ashland I, 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
229. Ashland 1, 504 F.2d at 1329.
230. Id. The court added, "Nor where many offenders are involved in creating a
great social problem is such proof constitutionally required." Id. (citing Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942)).
231. E.B. Overton et al., Inst. for Envtl. Studies, La. State Univ., High Resolution
Source Fingerprinting of Oils Stranded Along the Northern Gulf of Mexico Coastline
(Nov. 15, 1993) (abstract of an invited paper), in SETAC Platform Session Abstracts,
supra note 212.
232. Alcan 11, 964 F.2d 252, 270 n.29 (3d Cir. 1992). The Third Circuit rejected the
government's contention that commingling of various generators' waste at a site es-
tablishes indivisible harm as a matter of law but did not offer any plausible mode of
divisibility in such cases. Id. at 270.
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A. Divestiture Exxon Style
The most infamous example of ACF's applicability in CERCLA ac-
tions, is found in the Exxon Valdez litigation surrounding the oil spill
that occurred in Prince William Sound, Alaska.233 On March 24, 1989,
shortly after midnight, under the pilotage of an officer uncertified to
operate in the sound and a helmsman who was known by Exxon to be
incompetent to perform his duties, the Valdez ran aground on Bligh
Reef, a well-known and well-marked navigational hazard, and dis-
charged more than 10 million gallons of North Slope crude, creating
the nation's largest oil spill in history.234 By November 1989, the oil
had migrated more than 780 miles from Bligh Reef, contaminating the
waters and shorelines of some dozen Alaskan wildlife refuges, killing
more than 36,000 migratory birds, including more than 100 bald ea-
gles, and other varieties of wildlife.235
Exxon's defense against the claims of more than 40,000 plaintiffs
from all Sectors of Alaska's populace hinged on chemical finger-
prints.236 Relying on a series of studies that it paid for, Exxon sought
233. See United States v. Exxon Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1821 (D. Alaska Feb.
27, 1990). In March 1291, in a plea agreement in a criminal action brought .by the
federal government, Exon agreed to pay more than $1 billion in fines and penalties,-
thereby resolving all criminal charges by the governments of Alaska and the United
States. Pursuant to the agreement, Exxon Corp. pleaded guilty to one misdemeanor
violation of federal pollution law, and its subsidiary, Exxon Shipping Co., pleaded
guilty-to three misdemeanor violations. Stewart Yerton, A Look Back at Big Suits,
AM. LAW., Mar. 1994, at 112.
In the first phase of the civil litigation, the jury determined that Exxon was negli-
gent and reckless in the 1989 grounding of the Exxon Valdez in Alaska's Prince Wil-
liam Sound, causing a massive oil spill. Jury Finds Exxon Corp. Reckless in 1989
Grounding of Exxon Valdez, 113 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) 113 (June 15, 1994). This
exposed Exxon to liability for punitive damages. Id.
In the second phase, the same jury awarded $286 million to approximately 10,000
fishermen in compensation for demonstrable economic losses in the form of lost fish
catches and reduced fishing permit values resulting from the spill. Prospect of Hung
Jury in Exxon Valdez Threatens Entire US Case, Attorne*Says, 1994 Daily Env't Rep.
(BNA) 174 (Sept. 12, 1994).
In the third phase, jurors penalized Exxon to the tune of $5 billion, the largest
punitive damages award in environmental litigation to date. Exxon Ordered by Fed-
eral Court Jury to Pay $5 Billion in Punitive Damages, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1029
(Sept. 23, 1994).
More than 330 civil suits were filed against Exxon and its affiliates. Christine Cart-
wright, Comment, Natural Resource Damage Assessment: The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
and Its Implications, 17 RUrGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 451, 452-53 (1991). For a
discussion of the ensuing litigation, see John T. Hansen & Charles W. Ray, Jr., Alas-
kan Oil Spill: Legal Fallout, TRIAL, Oct. 1989, at 26.
234. Exxon, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1821, at *3; Federal Judge in Alaska Upholds
Verdicts in Exxon Valdez Case, 44 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1610 (Feb. 3, 1995) [here-
inafter Federal Judge Upholds Verdict].
235. Exxon, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1821, at *3; A Look Back at Big Suits, supra
note 233; Federal Judge Upholds Verdict, supra note 234; Jury Finds Exxon Reckless,
supra note 233.
236. Blum & Raloff, supra note 201 ("plaintiffs in the suits- against Exxon have
relied on the government's interpretation of the hydrocarbon data that [Exxon] be-
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to prove that much of the oil located in the sound could be attributed
to sources other than the supertanker spill.2 37 Oil samples collected
from islands and coastal sites in the sound were fingerprinted by scien-
tists on all sides of the litigation, producing a panoply of opinions.
Some scientists traced the oil to an asphalt storage tank in the nearby
town of Valdez that ruptured during a 1964 earthquake, to natural
seepage from the eastern Gulf of Alaska, and to drilling sites in Mon-
terey, California that had supplied oil to Alaska before production
began in the far north.238 Fourteen of the twenty-two samples carried
heavy to light carbon isotope ratios showing distinct fingerprints that
did not match those of the supertanker.239 These conclusions were
hardly dispositive, however. A U.S. Geological Survey ("USGS") re-
port on the newly fingerprinted oil samples from Prince William
Sound stated, "[I]t now seems easier for us to find asphalt residues
from 1964 than to find oil residues from the 1989 spill. '240
Some experts questioned' Exxon's interpretations of the testing re-
suits. 241  For example, the National Marine Fisheries Service("NMFS") disputed Exxon's disavowal of oil that carried a polycyclic
aromatic hydrocarbon signature similar to its own. 42 Both sides
agreed that seep crude mixed with diesel oil create a fingerprint that is
hard, to distinguish, from Exxon Valdez crude,243 but Exxon and the
NMFS became embroiled in a tug-of-war over the attribution of this
significant portion of the oil found in the sound.24 4 NMFS ge-
ochemists conceded that their studies attributed oil carrying a poly-
lieves is wrong"); Andrew Blum, Exxon Tries New Tack on Spill It Touts 'Finger-
prints,' NAT'L L.J., May 31, 1993, at 3 ("[T]he company is touting ... a technique
called chemical fingerprinting to prove that only a little of its oil from the 1989 spill is
still fouling the region around Prince William Sound.").
237. Blum & Raloff, supra note 201.
238. R. Monastersky, Geologic Detectives Track String of Spills, 144 Sci. NEws 165(1993).
239. Id. Carbon-isotopic values of -29.3 closely matched that from the Valdez; val-
ues of -23.8 reflected an oil rich in heavy carbon, an unusual and "precise signature"
only found at the Monterey, California, formation. The isotopic evidence discovered
by scientists at the U.S. Geological Survey ("USGS") suggested that the tarballs did
not come from the Exxon Valdez. Id.
240. Id. (emphasis added).
241. Id. One official from the Alaskan Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion ("ADEC") took issue with the USGS report's suggestion that a spill long past
would leave a greater mark on the shoreline than would Exxon's oil. Id. In many
areas heavily fouled by the spill in 1989, the ADEC found oil a few centimeters below
the apparently clean beach surface. Id. According to the ADEC, subsurface oil can
remain on the shoreline for many years because it sits above the high-tide mark, out
of reach of the flushing action of waves. Id. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration ("NOAA") found that Exxon Valdez oil had contaminated the Prince
William Sound environment and geochemists from the National Marine Fisheries Ser-
vice ("NMFS") suspected that Exxon had ascribed some Valdez oil to other sources.
Blum & Raloff, supra note 201.
242. Blum & Raloff, supra note 201.
243. Dahl, supra note 199, at B3; Blum & Raloff, supra note 201.
244. Blum & Raloff, supra note 201.
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cyclic aromatic hydrocarbon signature characteristic of North Slope
crude to Exxon Valdez.245 Exxon, on the other hand, minimized the
amount of. the signature ascribed to its supertanker by maximizing the
amount assigned to the diesel-seep mixture.246
Experts also questioned Exxon's methodology. For example, sam-
ples used to exonerate Exxon were taken from depths far below the
intertidal sediments where recently spilled oil would be expected to
accumulate, 47 Scientists would expect the fingerprint of oil found at
such depths to be much older-as much as 160 years old-because
the oil would have had time to settle 4 18 Exxon's opponents claim Ex-
xon used below-intertidal sediment samples to support Exxon's asser-
tion that much of the oil in Prince William Sound attributed to Exxon
was actually natural seepage. 49
Exxon's attempt to divest itself of liability for at least a portion of
the environmental damage in Prince William Sound on the foundation
of fingerprinting evidence was unsuccessful.2 50 Indeed, the fines lev-
ied against Exxon set records at the EPA.2 5' Weighing against Exxon
were the fact that no other PRP existed to share the financial burden
of the cleanup of "the greatest environmental disaster in United
States history 25 2 and the questionability of Exxon's oil fingerprint
analyses.s 3 In deference to the exigency of cleaning up the nation's
environmental pollution and protecting human health, the courts im-
pose a rigorous presumption of liability that is difficult to overcome.
The dual impact of liberal evidentiary standards and the customary
openhanded interpretation of CERCLA routinely steamrolls any
PRPs in the path of an EPA-initiated Superfund action. CERCLA




248. See id. NMFS studies support Exxon's finding of background contamination
with non-Exxon Valdez oil in deep sediments in Prince William Sound, but the same.
studies show that shallow, intertidal sediments generally remained free of petroleum
residues unless or until contaminated by the Exxon Valdez spill. Id.
249. Id.
250. The $5.3 billion penalties were upheld in January 1995. Federal Judge Upholds
Verdict, supra note 234. The district court rejected Exxon's contention that serious
procedural errors necessitated a new trial. Id.
251. Enforcement: New Records for Actions, Fines Set by EPA Despite Restructur-
ing of Programs, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1501 (Dec. 2, 1994).
252. Oil Transport, supra note 234. The Exxon Valdez spill has been called the
"Pearl Harbor" of the U.S. environmental improvement. 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS,
JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 4.37A (Supp. 1995). The spill lead to
the enactment of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (Supp. V
1993), which aims to expand prevention and preparedness activities, to improve emer-
gency response capabilities, and to ensure that shippers and oil companies pay the
costs of spills. See Rule Sets Criteria for Onshore Facilities Required to Prepare Oil
Spill Response Plans, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 465 (July 8, 1994).
253. See supra text accompanying notes 236-49.
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B. A Dose of Fairness
The Exxon Valdez litigation reveals the inadequacy of conventional
chemical analyses upon which the EPA typically relies. Conventional
methods have been recognized as fallible25 4 and have been challenged
as unreliable.255 The meager standard of proof adopted by the courts
reflects the impediments that the EPA encounters in applying outmo-
ded techniques to Superfund suits. When the contamination forms an
indivisible "'toxic soup' of many substances contributed by dozens, if
not hundreds, of industrial sources, '2 56 one court observed that, under
EPA-type techniques, defendants avoid liability by "carelessly al-
lowing their wastes to run into one large, unidentifiable morass at the
waste site, confident in the knowledge that the government must iden-
tify the wastes and prove causation.' 257
Notwithstanding Exxon's failure to mitigate its damages, the case
reflects both the courts' willingness to entertain evidence founded on
ACF and the courts' caution regarding the gravity of such proof. In
affirming the $5.3 billion damage award, the Exxon court concluded
that "'a qualitative assessment based on a host of facts and circum-
stances ... should not be overturned because of its record size.' "258
CONCLUSION
Since CERCLA's enactment, the courts have struggled to resolve
the. complex, often contradictory, inquiry into the application of joint
254. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 12 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20,701 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). Experts in this case testified that during the course of
migration, "indicator" chemicals would leave behind traces or "fingerprints" indicat-
ing the edge of the contamination plume. However, the court recognized the diffi-
.culty of such testing on a routine basis, and the uncertainty of the techniques.
[N]o negative inference can be made regarding the absence of TCDD.
While the presence of the [indicator] chemicals will indicate the presence of
TCDD, their absence may not be used to determine that the area is free
from such contamination. [T]o the extent possible under currently existing
technology, . . . the area of the contamination of these chemicals will be
explored, mapped, and finally defined.
Id.
255. See Boehm, supra note 8 (giving examples of defendants challenging govern-
ment findings); Dahl, supra note 199 (same). See also I.R. Kaplan et al., R.P. Global
Geochemistry Corp., Methods for Differentiating Identity and Sources of Mixed Pe-
troleum Pollutants in the Environment (Nov. 15, 1993) (abstract of an invited paper
showing that natural degradation of oil products makes the molecular composition
unrecognizable using conventional EPA-type chemical fingerprinting techniques) in
SETAC Platform Session Abstracts, supra note 212.
256. Rena Steinzor, Local Governments and Superfund: Who Will Pay the Tab?, 22
URB. LAW. 79, 88 (1990). See also Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 670
n.8 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1309 (E.D. Mo. 1987)
(asserting that commingling and migration of wastes at disposal sites make source
identification difficult).
257. Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1293 (D.R.I. 1986).
258. Federal Judge Upholds Verdict, supra note 234, at 1610 (quoting Judge H. Rus-
sel Holland of the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska).
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and several liability.259 Although CERCLA is silent with respect to
the scope of liability, the legislative history indicates that common-law
tort principles should be instructive in the allocation of liability once a
defendant is found to be a responsible party. The overwhelming bur-
den placed on the defendant to prove that its waste is divisible from
the overall harm has not been diminished by judicial innovations, such
as the various approaches to divisibility.26°
CERLCA's legislative history is littered with concern that tort prin-
ciples guide the imposition of joint and several liability, but the record
shows equal concern for the success of the nation's hazardous waste
cleanup regimen. It is the tension between these divergent goals that
the courts confront when weighing the EPA's burden of proof against
the defendant's right to a fair judgment.
ACF fulfills both of these goals. ACF can provide plaintiffs with an
expedient tool to prove the culpability of a defendant beyond mere
presumption. Furthermore, ACF offers defendants the means to sur-
mount CERCLA's draconian burden of proof of divisibility, thereby
extinguishing liability for cleanup costs-not appropriately attributable
to them. Moreover, ACF fortifies the courts' equitable powers by
providing solid evidence of reasonable bases for apportionment in
both cost recovery actions and contribution actions. Finally, ACF fur-
thers Superfund's goal to place the financial burden of the nation's
environmental cleanup on those responsible for the damage. ACF's
applicability in Superfund litigation assures a coherent correlation be-
tween the overriding goals of the nation's environmental regulations
.and the means by which these goals are attained.
259. See supra part II.A.
260. See supra part I.D.
